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Catch Me if You Can: 
An Analysis of New 
Enforcement Measures and 
Proposed Legislation to Combat 
the Sale of Counterfeit Products 
on the Internet 
 
Jeffrey A. Lindenbaum* and David Ewen** 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Like many things, the world of counterfeiting was forever 
changed by the Internet. The virtually impenetrable shield of 
online anonymity has created an environment where, for the 
first time, counterfeiters publicly and brazenly advertise, with 
impunity, that their products are indeed counterfeit. Rather 
than focusing on a calculable number of counterfeiters in a 
finite number of well-known and high-trafficked urban centers 
(e.g., New York City’s Chinatown district), brand owners are 
now faced with counterfeit websites that number in the 
thousands and change on a daily, and in some instances 
hourly, basis. Moreover, because a counterfeiter can, with 
minimal effort and little financial hardship, quickly replace one 
disabled website with a new one, the traditional enforcement 
measures have proven ineffective and cost-prohibitive. 
The overwhelming volume of counterfeit activity has left 
the government and brand owners to explore creative measures 
to attack this problem from new directions. For most it is 
simply not practical or economically feasible to address 
counterfeit websites one at a time. Instead, brand owners must 
seek solutions whereby a single enforcement effort disrupts 
multiple counterfeit websites. 
This Article will discuss two different approaches presently 
being employed by brand owners to combat this problem. The 
first involves commencing a single lawsuit against hundreds of 
1
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unidentified owners of counterfeit websites. Because of the 
difficulty with obtaining accurate contact information for the 
owners of these websites, courts in several jurisdictions have 
permitted deviations from the traditional methods of service, 
allowing a plaintiff to effectuate service through, for example, 
email and online postings. Because the products on these 
websites are obviously (and in many instances admittedly) 
counterfeit, courts have seemingly relaxed earlier practices 
which mandated a physical inspection of the alleged counterfeit 
products. Likewise, courts have provided injunctive relief 
directed towards third parties and have required very little, in 
terms of the posting of a bond to protect the defendants against 
an unlawful seizure. 
The second approach involves using payment processing 
companies, such as credit card associations, to exercise 
leverage over their international banking customers to 
terminate the counterfeiter’s bank accounts. These efforts do 
not focus on disabling a particular counterfeit website, but 
rather on disrupting the flow of funds to the counterfeit 
merchant’s account. Brand owners hope that, by disabling a 
merchant’s account, they can interrupt the flow of funds to 
multiple counterfeit websites operated by the same merchant. 
The Article will highlight the incentives for the credit card 
associations’ cooperation, including protection of their own 
brands as well as avoiding risks of contributory liability, and 
persuading Congress that stricter laws and oversight are 
unnecessary. 
Finally, the Article will analyze recent anti-counterfeiting 
legislation such as the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act and the 
Protect IP Act, as well as their predecessor, COICA, and opine 
whether, and how, these types of bills could assist brand 
owners with the two types of enforcement efforts outlined 
above. It will also comment on the strongly voiced objections to 
the legislation lodged by several online business owners and 
interest groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/1
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II. The Mass Domain Lawsuit 
 
A search for the phrase “replica rolex watch” on the Google 
search engine produces 14,200,000 results.1 Not surprisingly, 
the first page of these search results provides links to several 
websites offering counterfeit Rolex watches. Remarkably, nine 
pages into the search results, there are just as many 
counterfeit websites—many appearing to be original and 
unaffiliated with the results found on the earlier search engine 
result pages. The same is true for the results found at pages 
seventeen, twenty-nine, and continuing on through the Google 
results. Commencing a lawsuit to remove just one of these 
counterfeit websites would be an exercise in futility. This is 
what many describe as the unending game of “whack-a-mole:” 
as soon as one website is challenged, several more pop up in its 
place. Brand owners cannot justify the costs and time needed to 
prosecute an infringement lawsuit, simply to achieve a default 
judgment against a single defendant, who will never be 
identified, never satisfy any monetary judgment, and who will 
replace his counterfeit website with an entirely new site before 
the ink is even dry on the complaint. 
Seeking a creative alternative, several brand owners have 
pursued another option. Rather than commence a lawsuit 
against a single defendant (or a single website), brand owners 
have commenced what this Article refers to as a “mass domain 
lawsuit.” In these lawsuits, the brand owners join, in one 
action, as many as five hundred or more John Doe defendants, 
 
  * Jeffrey A. Lindenbaum is a partner in the New York Intellectual 
Property law firm, Collen IP. Mr. Lindenbaum graduated from the University 
at Buffalo School of Law. A personal thanks and dedication to my wife and 
boys for all their support, inspiration and for sacrificing quality “Daddy 
Time” for this Article. 
  ** David Ewen is an associate in the IP/IT department of McCarter & 
English, LLP in Hartford, Connecticut, and formerly an associate at Collen 
IP. David obtained his B.A., History from Vassar College in 2004, and J.D. 
from the University of Connecticut School of Law in 2009. 
1. GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/#hl=en&sclient=psyab&q=replica+rolex+watch&pbx=
1&oq=replica+rolex+watch&aq=f&aqi=g4&aql=&gs_sm=3&gs_upl=3385l399
3l3l6177l2l0l2l0l2l0l0l0ll2l0&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&fp=e08f40f4
badaf740&biw=1366&bih=566 (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). (searching “replica 
Rolex watch” in Google search). 
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and target hundreds of counterfeit websites. 
The response from each counterfeit defendant fully meets 
expectations: each of the defendants, without making an 
appearance, or revealing their identity, has defaulted.2 The 
brand owners, through these lawsuits, have taken advantage of 
the expedited default proceedings to quickly disable mass 
quantities of counterfeit websites, and interrupt the flow of 
funds to these sites. With relatively minimum investment, 
brand owners can make a noticeable impact on the volume of 
existing counterfeit websites, and quickly move on to the next 
group of sites. 
The relief obtained from these lawsuits is in many respects 
consistent with traditional counterfeit lawsuits. However, 
because of the special circumstances that arise from the 
pursuit of large quantities of quickly-shifting, online 
counterfeit websites, the courts have endorsed some remedies 
not typically seen in traditional counterfeit actions. This 
Section will look at six of the mass domain lawsuits that were 
filed over the past two years and analyze the similarities and 
differences between these actions and more traditional 
counterfeit lawsuits. In the end, it will consider whether the 
mass domain lawsuit is a successful tool for attacking the 
“whack-a-mole” problem. 
 
A. Recent Examples of Mass Domain Lawsuits 
 
 1. Chanel in the Western District of Tennessee 
 
New York-based Chanel, Inc. brought the first of these 
lawsuits on September 20, 2010, in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Tennessee.3 The complaint, 
which was filed under seal, named five hundred John Does, 
and listed 172 defendant domain names.4 Chanel, owner of the 
brands CHANEL and the interlocking “CC’s” asserted claims 
for trademark infringement and counterfeiting, false 
 
2. Except for a very small number of defendants who were voluntarily 
dismissed by the brand owners. 
3. Complaint at 1, Chanel, Inc. v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-cv-2684-STA-dkv 
(W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 2010). 
4. Id. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/1
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designation of origin, cyberpiracy and unfair competition.5 
The court granted Chanel’s ex parte motion for a 
temporary restraining order.6 The court’s order included 
injunctive relief typical for a trademark counterfeiting action, 
such as enjoining defendants from manufacturing, importing, 
promoting, or selling any products bearing the Chanel 
trademarks, and destroying evidence related to the alleged 
infringement.7 But it also granted extraordinary relief, 
particularly given the very little evidentiary support for each 
individual website. First, the order states: 
The top-level domain (TLD) Registry for the 
Subject Domain Names . . . shall change the 
Registrar of record for the Subject Domain 
Names to the United States based Registrar 
GoDaddy.com, Inc. where they will be placed in a 
holding account in trust for the Court. . . . 
Additionally, GoDaddy.com, Inc. shall 
immediately update the Domain Name System 
(“DNS”) data it maintains for the Subject 
Domain Names, which links the domain names . 
. . which will cause the domain names to resolve 
to the website where a copy of the . . . documents 
on file in this action are displayed. Alternatively, 
Go Daddy.com, Inc. may institute a domain name 
forwarding which will automatically redirect any 
visitor to the Subject Domain Names to the 
following Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”) 
http://servingnotice.com/oft/ index.html whereon 
a copy of the . . . file in this action shall be 
displayed.8 
The order was not limited to just the domain names listed 
in the complaint, but also provided that should Chanel, during 
the pendency of this action, discover additional infringing 
domain names, these too may be added to the restraining 
 
5. Id. at 4:10-14. 
6. Order Granting Ex Parte Application for Entry of Temporary 
Restraining Order at 6, Chanel, Inc. v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-cv-2684-BBD-dkv 
(W.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2010). 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 7-8:5. 
5
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order.9 
Another distinctive element of this order was its 
authorization of service via email and by posting the relevant 
papers on a website: 
Plaintiff shall serve a copy of the Ex Parte 
Application and this Order and all other 
pleadings and documents on file in this action on 
Defendants by posting a copy of the Ex Parte 
Application and this Order on the website 
located at http://servingnotice.com/oft/index.html 
within forty-eight (48) [hours] of the Subject 
Domain Names being transferred to the Go 
Daddy holding account and such notice shall so 
given shall be deemed good and sufficient service 
thereof. Plaintiff shall thereafter further provide 
notice of these proceedings and copies of the 
documents on file in this matter to Defendants 
using all email addresses identified in the 
registration data for each of the Subject Domain 
Names.10 
Finally, the court’s order mandated that Chanel post a 
bond in the amount of twenty thousand dollars “prior to 
requesting the Registries to transfer control of the Subject 
Domain Names.”11 The order also directed that the file remain 
sealed until the subject domain names were transferred to the 
court’s control.12 
Fifteen days later, the court converted the temporary 
restraining order (“TRO”) into a preliminary injunction, 
adopting the same provisions of the TRO, and unsealed the 
court file.13 The preliminary injunction directed that Chanel’s 
 
9. Id. at 8:8 (“This Temporary Restraining Order shall apply to the 
Subject Domain Names and any other domain names properly brought to the 
Court’s attention and verified by sworn affidavit to be used by Defendants for 
the purpose of counterfeiting the Chanel Marks at issue in this action and/or 
unfairly competing with Chanel in connection with search engine results 
pages.”). 
10. Id. at 9:11. 
11. Id. at 8:9. 
12. Id. at 10:12. 
13. Order Granting Application for Preliminary Injunction, Chanel, Inc. 
v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-cv-2684-BBD-dkv (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 15, 2010). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/1
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twenty-thousand-dollar bond be maintained.14 
 
 2. Chanel in the District of Nevada (Las Vegas) 
 
Exactly one year after commencing its action in Tennessee, 
Chanel, on September 20, 2011, brought a second lawsuit in 
the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.15 
The caption of this action identified the defendants as John 
Does 1-1000,16 and the complaint specifically disclosed 399 
defendant-domain names.17 The language of the complaint, 
motion papers, and resulting temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction tracked those of the earlier-filed 
Tennessee action. 
 
 3. Tiffany in the District of Nevada (Las Vegas) 
 
On April 18, 2011, New Jersey-based Tiffany (NJ), LLC, 
known for its manufacture of luxury goods, including jewelry, 
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District 
of Nevada.18 The defendants were identified as John Does 1-
1000, and the pleading listed 223 defendant-domain names.19 
Tiffany brought claims for trademark counterfeiting and 
infringement, cyberpiracy, and unfair competition, all 
pertaining to sixteen registered trademarks, most notably its 
TIFFANY and TIFFANY & CO. marks.20 
The relief granted by the court closely followed that 
obtained by Chanel only a few months earlier in this same 
court. As with Chanel, Tiffany was required to post a bond of 
 
14. Id. at 11:9. 
15. Complaint, Chanel, Inc. v. The P'ships & Unincorporated Ass’ns. 
Identified on Sch. “A”, No. 2:11-cv-01508-KJD-PAL (D. Nev. Sept. 20, 2011). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Complaint, Tiffany (NJ), LLC v. The P'ships & Unincorporated 
Ass’ns. Identified on Sch. “A”, No. 2:11-cv-00590-LDG-CWH (D. Nev. Apr. 18, 
2011). 
19. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for Entry of 
Temporary Restraining Order at 10-14, Tiffany (NJ), LLC. v. The P'ships & 
Unincorporated Ass’ns. Identified on Sch. “A”, No. 2:11-cv-00590-LDG-CWH 
(D. Nev. May 11, 2011). 
20. Id. at 2-3. 
7
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twenty thousand dollars, and was authorized to serve the 
defendants via email, and by posting the relevant court-filed 
papers on http://servingnotice.com/off/index.html.21 
 
 4. Philip Morris in the Southern District of Florida 
 
Philip Morris USA, Inc., a company organized under the 
laws of, and residing in, Virginia, filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida on November 
9, 2011, against defendants Zhilin Jiang, Haidong Huang, 
Andy Ling a/k/a Andyling, and Does 1-10.22 The complaint 
identified fifty-eight defendant-websites.23 Philip Morris 
brought claims for trademark counterfeiting and infringement, 
false designation of origin, and cybersquatting, relating to its 
MARLBORO mark and its Marlboro packaging design mark.24 
Similar to the Chanel and Tiffany matters, Philip Morris 
was permitted to serve the defendants and provide notice via 
email and posting a copy of the pleadings at 
http://servingnotice.com/jiang/index.html.25 Philip Morris 
secured the same preliminary relief as Chanel and Tiffany, 
including transfer of the subject domain names to the court’s 
custody.26 Notably, the Southern District of Florida also 
directed non-party Western Union27 to divert and hold all 
money transfers to the named defendants, and to provide 
Philip Morris with records of any money transfers that have 
been paid to the named defendants. The court’s preliminary 
injunction stated: 
 
21. Id. at 8:11,13. 
22. Complaint, Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Jiang, No. 1:11-cv-24049-KMM 
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2011). 
23. Id. at 17-18. 
24. Id. at 4:9-12. 
25. Order Granting Ex Parte Application for Alternate Serv. at 3, Philip 
Morris USA Inc. v. Jiang, No. 1:11-cv-24049-KMM (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2011). 
26. Order Granting Application for Entry of Preliminary Injunction, 
Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Jiang, No. 1:11-CV-24049-KMM (S.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 
2011), available at http://servingnotice.com/jiang/026%20-
%20Order%20Granting%20PI.pdf. 
27. Id. at 10 n.4 (noting that the preliminary injunction order states that 
Western Union is licensed to do business in the State of Florida, and is 
therefore subject to personal jurisdiction in this court). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/1
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Western Union Financial Services, Inc. 
(“Western Union”) shall divert and/or continue 
diverting all money transfers sent by United 
States consumers to: (1) Zhilin Jiang in Putian, 
China . . . (2) Haidong Huang in Putian, China . . 
. and (3) Haidon Huang . . . and continue to hold 
such transfers until it receives further direction 
from the Court.28 
Although the Philip Morris case included considerably 
fewer domain names and defendants than other lawsuits 
discussed in this Article, the Southern District of Florida 
required a noticeably larger bond in the amount of one hundred 
thousand dollars.29 
 
 5. True Religion in the Southern District of New York 
 
California-based jeans manufacturers, True Religion 
Apparel, Inc. and Guru Denim, Inc., filed suit on November 15, 
2011, against forty-one defendants and identifying fifty-eight 
domain names (which increased to eighty-six by the time the 
temporary restraining order was executed).30 The suit alleged 
claims for trademark counterfeiting and infringement, 
cybersquatting, copyright infringement, unfair competition, 
false designation of origin, design patent infringement, and 
unlawful deceptive acts and practices,31 pertaining to the 
advertising and sale of counterfeit jeans and other products.32 
The Southern District of New York issued an order that 
restrained not only the named defendants, but also “any 
persons acting in concert or participation with them. . . 
including, without limitation, Internet Service Providers 
(“ISP”)” from using the True Religion trademarks and 
copyrights.33 In addition to enjoining the defendants from 
 
28. Id. at 10. 
29. Id. at 11:12. 
30. Complaint at 20, True Religion Apparel, Inc. v. Lei, No. 1:11-cv-
08242-HB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2011). 
31. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (2010). 
32. Complaint at 21-27, True Religion Apparel, Inc. v. Lei, No. 1:11-cv-
08242-HB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2011). 
33. Temporary Restraining Order, Order to Disable Certain Web Sites, 
9
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further infringing activity, the court ordered: 
 
[A]ny third party providing services in 
connection with any Defendant and/or 
Defendants’ websites, including without 
limitation, ISPs, back-end service providers, 
affiliate program providers, web designers, and 
sponsored search engine or ad-word providers, 
shall immediately temporarily disable service to 
any and all Defendants’ Infringing Web Sites.34 
[A]ny third party providing services in 
connection with any Defendant and/or 
Defendants’ Infringing Web Sites, including 
without limitation, ISPs, back-end service 
providers, web designers, sponsored search 
engine or ad-word providers, banks, merchant 
account providers including PayPal, Inc., third 
party processors and other payment processing 
services, shippers, domain name registrars, 
domain name registries and online third-party 
selling platforms (collectively ‘Third Party 
Providers’) shall within five (5) days after receipt 
of such notice provide copies of all documents 
and records in such person or entity’s possession 
or control relating to[Defendants, their websites 
and financial accounts owned by Defendants].35 
Further still, the court’s order, in broad, sweeping 
language, directed any entity that receives actual notice of the 
order to freeze all financial accounts connected to the 
defendants or their infringing websites: 
[A]ny banks, savings and loan associations, 
payment processors or other financial 
institutions, including without limitation, 
PayPal, Inc., or other merchant account 
providers, payment providers, or third party 
 
Asset Restraining Order, Expedited Discovery Order and Order to Show 
Cause for Preliminary Injunction at 9-10, True Religion Apparel, Inc. v. Lei, 
No. 1:11-cv-8242-HB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011). 
34. Id. at 15. 
35. Id. at 10-11. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/1
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processors for any Defendant, any of Defendants’ 
operations, Defendants’ Infringing Web Sites or 
for any other website owned or controlled by 
Defendants, who receive actual notice of this 
Order, shall immediately locate all accounts 
connected to Defendants or Defendants’ 
Infringing Web Sites and that such accounts be 
temporarily restrained and enjoined from 
transferring or disposing of any money or other 
of Defendants’ assets . . . .36 
The court required the plaintiffs to post a bond of only ten 
thousand dollars, and authorized service via email to the 137 
email addresses identified in the complaint.37 
 
 6. Coach in the Eastern District of Virginia 
 
Following closely after Chanel’s success in Tennessee, 
Coach, Inc., a corporation organized under the laws of the State 
of Maryland, and headquartered in New York City, filed suit on 
March 25, 2011, in in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia (aptly known as the “Rocket 
Docket”38).39 Unlike the other mass domain lawsuits discussed 
in this Article, Coach did not bring its action against a series of 
unidentified John Doe defendants. Instead, Coach commenced 
an in rem action, under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), against the 
domain names themselves. Coach’s complaint was initially 
against 419 defendant-domain names, and this number was 
then expanded to 473 domain names upon the filing of Coach’s 
amended complaint on April 1, 2011.40 The complaint included 
 
36. Id. at 14. 
37. Id. at 12. 
38. This title bestowed on the Eastern District of Virginia dates back 
approximately forty years, when Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. decided cases 
were being managed far too slowly, and began ruling on motions during 
argument, and was said to have tried an entire case in a single afternoon. See 
Jerry Markon, A Double Dose of Molasses in the Rocket Docket, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 3, 2004, at C04, available at http://wp-dr.wpni.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A3007-2004Oct2.html. 
39. Coach, Inc. v. 1941coachoutletstore.com, 1:11cv309 (JCC/JFA), 2012 
WL 27918 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012). 
40. Amended Complaint for In Rem Injunctive Relief, Coach, Inc. v. 
11
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a claim for in rem injunctive relief, and asserted Coach’s 
registration, for among others, its COACH mark.41 
As will be discussed below in detail, this case did not follow 
track with the other lawsuits discussed in this Article, because 
although preliminary relief and an injunction were sought, the 
matter was resolved by way of default before the request for 
preliminary relief was adjudicated by the court.42 Also 
noteworthy is that Magistrate Judge John F. Anderson 
challenged Coach’s joinder of seemingly unrelated defendants 
into a single suit, as well as Coach’s request to serve the 
defendants and provide notice via electronic means.43 
 
B. Relief Obtained in Mass Domain Lawsuits that is Consistent 
with Traditional Counterfeit Actions 
 
Much of the relief secured by the plaintiffs in these mass 
domain lawsuits is quite common in actions involving sales of 
counterfeit products. To obtain a temporary restraining order 
and/or a preliminary injunction in an action involving 
counterfeit products, federal courts look to whether: (1) the 
movant has a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the 
movant will suffer irreparable harm; and (3) the public interest 
will be served by issuing the injunction.44 
Once a brand owner demonstrates a likelihood of consumer 
confusion, most courts presume that the brand owner will 
suffer irreparable injury should the infringement continue.45 
Moreover, removing counterfeit goods from the marketplace, 
and protecting consumers from being misled as to the source of 
the products they are purchasing, has been widely accepted as 
 
1941coachoutletstore.com, No. 11CV00309, 2011 WL 2621985 (E.D. Va. Apr. 
1, 2011). 
41. Id. ¶ 483. 
42. See Coach, Inc. v. 1941coachoutletstore.com, 1:11cv309 (JCC/JFA), 
2012 WL 27918 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012). 
43. See Coach, Inc. v. 1941coachoutletstore.com, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
150693 (E.D. Va. Nov. 25, 2011). 
44. See Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 905 (6th Cir. 2007). 
45. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri’s Grand Foods, Inc., 453 F.3d 
377, 382 (6th Cir. 2006); Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 
612 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002); Nautilus Group, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 
372 F.3d 1330, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/1
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serving the public interest.46 
In each of the mass domain lawsuits, the plaintiffs easily 
established: (1) ownership of the trademarks at issue (each was 
supported by a federal registration); (2) the defendants had 
used the marks without authorization of the plaintiff; and (3) 
the defendants’ use is likely to cause confusion (the identical 
mark was applied to goods intentionally designed to look like 
products manufactured by the plaintiffs). 
Accordingly, it comes as no surprise that the brand owners 
were able to obtain a temporary restraining order without the 
defendants being afforded notice and an opportunity to 
respond. According to 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d), which governs civil 
actions involving counterfeit marks, “the court may, upon ex 
parte application, grant an order . . . for the seizure of goods 
and counterfeit marks involved in such violation and the 
means of making such marks, and records documenting the 
manufacturer, sale, or receipt of things involved in such 
violation.”47 
Likewise, the ordered restraint on future manufacturing 
and promoting any products bearing the counterfeit marks is 
far from controversial. Mandating a hold on all documents and 
information relevant to the counterfeit activity is not only 
consistent with Section 1116(d), but also with the more general 
principles that require a hold on discoverable information as 
soon as litigation is commenced or reasonably anticipated. 
Moreover, federal courts, in counterfeit actions, have also 
routinely permitted a hold on any financial assets that can be 
reasonably associated with the counterfeit activity.48 In many 
cases this results in an order “freezing” bank accounts. 
 
46. See Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th 
Cir. 1987); Chanel, Inc. v. Eukuk.com, No. 2:11-cv-01508-KJD-PAL, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12904 (D. Nev. Jan. 31, 2012); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. 
v. P'ships & Unincorporated Ass’ns, No. 2:11-cv-00738-PMP-RJJ2012, U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1481 (D. Nev. Jan. 4, 2012). 
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (West 2011). Ex parte relief is widely accepted as 
a necessary means to prevent the alleged counterfeiter from concealing 
evidence of its actions. See Century Home Entm’t, Inc. v. Laser Beat, Inc., 
859 F. Supp. 636, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Does, 876 
F. Supp. 407, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
48. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 
982 (11th Cir. 1995); Microsoft Corp. v. U-Top Printing Corp., No. 93-16048, 
1995 U.S. App LEXIS 414 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 1995). 
13
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In light of the broad relief which has long been accepted for 
counterfeit actions, including that which is expressly 
authorized under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d), most of what appears in 
the temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions 
issued in these mass domain lawsuits is consistent with the 
relief routinely secured in more traditional, “brick and mortar” 
counterfeit lawsuits. 
 
C. Notable Differences Between Relief in Mass Domain 
Lawsuits and Traditional Counterfeit Actions 
 
While much of the relief obtained in these mass domain 
lawsuits runs parallel to that seen in more traditional 
counterfeit actions, there are several notable departures. 
Arguably, these departures reflect the courts’ endorsement of 
brand owner’s efforts to stretch controlling laws and precedent 
to overcome the latest hurdles created by the explosion of 
counterfeit websites. This Section will examine five prominent 
departures, namely: (1) permitting service and publication by 
email and on a website; (2) joining of seemingly unrelated 
defendants in a single lawsuit; (3) lowering the threshold of 
evidentiary support required to establish that the accused 
goods are counterfeit; (4) compelling third parties, such as 
financial institutions and registrars, to take action; and (5) 
setting a bond amount that represents very little security when 
considered in connection with the large number of potential 
defendants impacted by the court’s order. 
 
 1. Service by Email and Electronic Notice 
 
In the mass domain lawsuits the defendants reside, almost 
exclusively, outside of the United States—the vast majority 
being located in China. Accordingly, service for a federal 
lawsuit is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f).49 
Rule 4(f) prescribes that a person not within any judicial 
district of the United States may be served “by any 
internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably 
 
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(2) (a foreign 
corporation may be served “in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f)”). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/1
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calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the 
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents.”50 Service under the Hague 
Convention is a lengthy and costly procedure, which often 
requires translation and hand delivery of the documents.51 
Typically, a defendant located in a foreign country that is a 
member of the Hague Convention (e.g., China), must be served 
in accordance with the Convention’s rules.52 However, because 
counterfeit website owners routinely provide fictitious contact 
information and addresses, the service requirements under the 
Hague Convention do not apply.53 Thus, while in most 
instances concealing the location of a potential defendant 
makes enforcement more difficult, the website owners have 
actually helped ease the burden on brand owners. 
Since the Hague Convention does not apply in those 
instances where the defendant has concealed its location, a 
brand owner may serve the complaint in accordance with 
Federal Rule 4(f), which provides, in part, that a foreign party 
may be served by: 
delivering a copy of the summons and of the 
complaint to the individual personally; or . . . 
using any form of mail that the clerk addresses 
and sends to the individual and that requires a 
 
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(1). 
51. See Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435, 
450 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Pain v. United Techs. Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 788 
(D.D.C. 1980)) (“[A] number of courts have observed, the Hague Convention 
machinery is quite slow and costly even when the foreign government agrees 
to cooperate.”). 
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(1). 
53. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, art. 1, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 
361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt14en.pdf (“This Convention shall 
not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is 
not known.”); see China, People’s Republic of, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.details&sid=30 (The People’s 
Republic of China became a member state of the Hague Convention in 1987); 
see also Gucci Am., Inc. v. Huoqing, No. C-09-05969 JCS, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 783, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2011) (defendant “operates anonymously 
via the Internet using false physical address information in order to conceal 
his location and avoid liability for his unlawful conduct.”). 
15
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signed receipt; or by other means not prohibited 
by international agreement, as the court orders.54 
Service by email was very rare until the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink.55 
In Rio, the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiff’s motion under 
Federal Rule 4(f)(3) to serve the foreign defendant by email.56 
In permitting this deviation, the court first rejected defendant’s 
argument that service by email under Rule 4(f)(3) should only 
be a last resort, and that there was some hierarchy that must 
be followed before a party may rely on Rule 4(f)(3).57 The court 
concluded that “service of process under Rule 4(f)(3) is neither 
a ‘last resort’ nor ‘extraordinary relief.’ It is merely one means 
among several which enables service of process on an 
international defendant.”58 
In deciding whether to permit service of process by email 
the court held that: 
Even if facially permitted by Rule 4(f)(3), a 
method of service of process must also comport 
with constitutional notions of due process. To 
meet this requirement, the method of service 
crafted by the district court must be “reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the 
action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections.”59 
The Rio court went on to find that 
[t]o be sure, the Constitution does not require 
any particular means of service of process, only 
 
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(2)-(3). 
55. Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014-15 (9th 
Cir. 2007); see also Kevin W. Lewis, E-Service: Ensuring the Integrity of 
International E-Mail Service of Process, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 285 
(2008); Ronald J. Hedges, Kenneth N. Rashbaum & Adam C. Losey, 
Electronic Service of Process at Home and Abroad: Allowing Domestic 
Electronic Service of Process in the Federal Courts, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 56 
(2009). 
56. Rio Properties, 284 F.3d at 1014-19. 
57. Id. at 1015-16. 
58. Id. at 1015 (citations omitted). 
59. Id. at 1016-1017 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/1
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that the method selected be reasonably 
calculated to provide notice and an opportunity 
to respond. In proper circumstances, this broad 
constitutional principle unshackles the federal 
courts from anachronistic methods of service and 
permits them entry into the technological 
renaissance.60 
In Rio, the court concluded that service by email was not 
only proper, but was likely the best means to reach the 
defendant who “structured its business such that it could be 
contacted only via its email address.”61 Since Rio, many other 
federal courts have permitted service by email using Rio’s 
guiding principle that service by email may be appropriate 
when it proves to be a reliable method to provide the party 
notice and an opportunity to respond.62 
In the case of the mass domain lawsuits (including several 
of those highlighted in this article), most courts have not 
hesitated to permit service by email. The circumstances 
presented by the mass domain lawsuits fit squarely within the 
Rio framework for when service by email is proper. First, in the 
vast majority of these cases, the counterfeit website owners are 
located outside of the country. Second, because the website 
owners provide a fictitious address, service under the Hague 
convention does not apply.63 Third, in most instances the 
business of the counterfeit website owners is operated 
exclusively through the Internet, and email is the most reliable 
means to successfully reach each defendant.64 Finally, the 
courts can take comfort knowing that, at least in the cases 
discussed in this article, defendants will also receive notice 
when attempting to visit their own websites, since their 
 
60. Id. at 1017 (citations omitted). 
61. Id. at 1018. 
62. See, e.g., Gurung v. Malhotra, No. 10 Civ. 5086 (VM), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 136578, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011); see also RPost Holdings, Inc. 
v. Kagan, No. 2:11-cv-238-JRG, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7566, at *5 (E.D. Tex. 
Jan. 23, 2012); see also Portal Live, LLC v. Choukron, No.: 11-60203-Civ-
Cohn/Seltzer, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98623, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2011). 
63. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 53, at art. 1. 
64. See, e.g., Rio Properties, 284 F.3d at 1018. 
17
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domains are re-directed to a page that posts the court file.65 
One notable exception to the ease in which brand owners 
have secured permission to serve the pleadings via email, has 
been the Coach case brought in the Eastern District of 
Virginia. On April 29, 2011, Magistrate Judge John F. 
Anderson conducted a hearing in which he raised concern 
about Coach’s one-size-fits-all approach to the hundreds of 
defendants.66 In particular, Judge Anderson expressed doubt 
that all of the postal addresses associated with the domains 
were fictitious.67 Coach relied on the fact that prior to filing 
suit it had sent cease and desist letters to each of the 
defendants at their addresses of record, but had not received a 
single response.68 Coach concluded that the addresses must be 
fictitious, never addressing the possibility that some letters 
were received, but simply ignored. In the end, Judge Anderson 
ordered that service be provided by postal mail and email.69 
The mass domain lawsuit brought by Coach in the Eastern 
District of Virginia rasises another issue regarding notice to a 
defendant. In that case, Coach brought an in rem action under 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2), not against any person or entity, but 
against the domain names themselves.70 As such, Coach was 
also required to publish “notice of the action as the court may 
direct promptly after filing the action.”71 Coach moved the 
Court to permit publication via electronic means. Judge 
Anderson rejected this request as well, but required as an 
alternative only that Coach publish the notice once in the Legal 
Times.72 
 
65. See, e.g., Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, Philip Morris 
USA, Inc. v. Jiang, Case No. 11-CV-24049-KMM (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2011), 
available at http://servingnotice.com/jiang/index.html; see also Complaint for 
Injunctive Relief, Tiffany (NJ), LLC v. The P'ships & Unincorporated Ass’ns. 
Identified on Sch. “A”, Case No.2:11-cv-00590-LDG-GWF (D.C. Nev. Apr. 18, 
2011), available at http://servingnotice.com/off/index.html (each court filing is 
available to the defendants, and the public, in .pdf format). 
66. Coach, Inc. v. 1941coachoutletstore.com, No. 1:11cv0309 (JCC/JFA), 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150693, at *25-26 (E.D. Va. Nov. 25, 2011). 
67. Id. at *24-25 (emphasis added). 
68. Id. at *31. 
69. Id. at *34. 
70. Id. at *2. 
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(bb) (West 2011). 
72. Transcript of Hearing at 15, Coach, Inc. v. 1941couchoutletstore.com, 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/1
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Although Magistrate Anderson’s ruling is wholly 
consistent with traditional methods of providing notice in this 
country, one must question the practical value of publication in 
the Legal Times for an operator of a counterfeit website that 
resides, for example, in China. Perhaps recognizing this point, 
Judge Anderson highlights that because this is an in rem 
action, the notice requirement is not just for the defendant, but 
for any third party who may have a claim to the property.73 
However, even Judge Anderson acknowledges that this 
elevates form over function, noting that “[t]his is the fiction we 
deal with in an in rem case.”74 
 
 2. Joinder of Unrelated Defendants 
 
In the mass domain lawsuits, brand owners have joined 
together in a single suit as many as several hundred different 
defendants. In some instances, after initially moving against 
dozens of defendants, brand owners have supplemented their 
pleadings by submitting several new lists of infringing 
defendants.75 To date, no defendant in these mass domain 
lawsuits has challenged the propriety of joining hundreds of 
seemingly unrelated defendants; rather almost every defendant 
has defaulted without making an appearance. The very few 
defendants that may have made some form of an appearance 
presumably settled with the brand owners immediately, as it 
seems the parties quietly stipulated to their dismissal before 
any responsive papers were filed with the courts.76 
The issue of joinder, however, was raised by one court. In 
the Coach case, Magistrate Anderson sua sponte challenged the 
propriety of joining numerous defendants into a single suit 
 
No. 1:11-cv-00309-JCC –JFA (E.D. Va. Apr. 29, 2011). 
73. Id. at 14. 
74. Id. 
75. See Memorandum of Points and Auths. in Support of Plaintiff’s 
Second Ex Parte Application for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction at 18, Chanel v. The P'ships & Unincorporated 
Ass’ns. Identified on Sch. “A”, No. 2:11-CV-01508-KJD-PAL (D. Nev. Nov. 9, 
2011). 
76. See, e.g., Complaint, Chanel, Inc. v. The P'ships & Unincorporated 
Ass’ns. Identified on Sch. “A” at 9, No. 2:11-cv-01508-KJD-PAL (D. Nev. Sept. 
20, 2011). 
19
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where there was no evidence that the defendants were related 
or associated with one another.77 
Federal Rule 20(a)(2) states that persons may be joined in 
one action as defendants if “(A) any right to relief is asserted 
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with 
respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or 
series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of 
law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.”78 
Magistrate Anderson explained that to “satisfy the transaction 
or occurrence test under Rule 20(a)(2), there must be a logical 
relationship between the events giving rise to the cause of 
action against each defendant.”79 Rule 20 “should be construed 
in light of its purpose, ‘to promote trial convenience and 
expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby 
preventing multiple lawsuits.’”80 
The Magistrate’s report and recommendation concluded 
that, but for eleven of the asserted domain names that had a 
common postal and email address, the remaining 359 domain 
names asserted in this lawsuit should not have been joined in 
one action and should be severed.81 He found that “the evidence 
presented is insufficient to establish that Coach’s claims 
against all defendant domain names are related, that they 
arise from the same transaction or occurrence, or that there is 
any joint action among all the defendant domain names that 
warrants relief under the ACPA in a single action.”82 For 11 of 
the domain names, Magistrate Anderson did find that Coach 
had satisfied the requirements of Rule 20(a)(2), as it appeared 
these 11 domain names were registered by the same entity, at 
the same postal address and 10 of them share the same email 
address.83 
Following a timely submitted Objection by Coach, 
Magistrate Anderson’s report and recommendation, pursuant 
 
77. Coach, Inc. v. 1941coachoutletstore.com, No. 1:11cv0309 (JCC/JFA), 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150693, at *25-26 (E.D. Va. Nov. 25, 2011). 
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2). 
79. Coach, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150693, at *13 (emphasis added). 
80. Id. at *14-15 (quoting Saval v. BL Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir. 
1983)). 
81. Id. at *43-46. 
82. Id. at *25. 
83. Id. at *26-27. 
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to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, was then reviewed de 
novo by District Court Judge James C. Cacheris.84 Judge 
Cacheris ultimately rejected Magistrate Anderson’s conclusion 
that all but eleven of the defendant domain names must be 
severed from this action.85 However, Judge Cacheris reached 
this conclusion without determining whether Coach’s 
allegations comply with the joinder requirements of Rule 
20(a)(2).86 Instead, the court concluded that “it must disregard 
any potential defects related to joinder, as they do not affect 
any party’s substantial rights, and the Court’s correction of 
those defects under Rule 21 would not be on just terms.”87 The 
Court’s ruling was based on the fact that each of the 
defendants in this action was in default: “each Domain Name 
Defendant is individually subject to default. And, ‘there is no 
prejudice to any defaulting defendant, whose liability may be 
established upon default irrespective of the presence of any 
other defendant.’”88 
Taking a very practical approach, Judge Cacheris avoids 
determining whether Rule 20 would preclude joinder, 
recognizing that since each defendant is in default, they suffer 
no prejudice by having the default entered against them jointly 
along with hundreds of other unrelated defendants. Practically, 
the very real prejudice suffered by each defendant is that, but 
for being able to join hundreds of defendants into a single 
lawsuit, Coach would almost certainly not have expended the 
resources to sue each defendant separately. In other words 
each defendant was likely sued only because joining several 
hundred defendants in a single lawsuit made it possible (and 
not cost-prohibitive) to commence the action. This is not likely 
the type of prejudice a Court would consider because Rules 
regarding joinder do not create a substantive right not to be 
sued. Instead, the guiding principle that “Rule 20 should be 
 
84. Coach, Inc. v. 1941coachoutletstore.com, No. 1:11cv309 (JCC/JFA), 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1311 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012). 
85. Id. at *14. 
86. Id. at *12-13 (although he does not resolve the merits of the joinder 
question, notably, he identifies no error in Magistrate Anderson’s 
interpretation of Rule 20(a)(2)). 
87. Id. at *13. 
88. Id. at *12-13 (quoting Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. D&L Amusement & 
Entm't, 702 F. Supp. 2d 104, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
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construed in light of its purpose ‘to promote trial convenience 
and expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby 
preventing multiple lawsuits,’” seems to fit squarely with the 
practical justice rendered by Judge Cacheris.89 
Had Judge Cacheris not rejected Magistrate Anderson’s 
recommendation, this case could have very well meant the end 
to the mass domain name lawsuit. But, until the joinder issue 
is raised by a non-defaulting defendant the mass domain suit 
will remain an available tool for brand owners to attack 
counterfeit websites.90 
 
 3. Lower Threshold of Evidentiary Support to Establish 
Goods are Counterfeit 
 
Another way that the mass domain lawsuits are distinct 
from the traditional counterfeit seizure actions is that the 
courts appear to accept a lower threshold of proof to support 
the brand owner’s allegation that the goods are indeed 
counterfeit. Under the Counterfeit Statute, a party may obtain 
an order of seizure with regard to counterfeit activity “based on 
an affidavit or the verified complaint establishing facts 
sufficient to support the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
required for such order.”91 In the traditional counterfeit 
context, a brand owner would typically satisfy this requirement 
by hiring an investigator, who would make a purchase (or 
several purchases) of the alleged counterfeit goods. The goods 
would then be physically inspected by a corporate 
representative who is familiar with the company’s 
manufacturing process and use of its brands. Upon finding 
such goods to be counterfeit, the representative would prepare 
 
89. Coach, Inc. v. 1941coachoutletstore.com, No. 1:11cv0309 (JCC/JFA), 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150693, at *14-15 (E.D. Va. Nov. 25, 2011) (quoting 
Saval v. BL Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir. 1983)). 
90. Although very unlikely to occur in the counterfeit context 
(particularly given there would be no public interest served), Congress has 
recently enacted similar laws with regard to patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 299 
(West 2011) (recent amendments to the Patent Act under The America 
Invents Act mandating that a “patent troll” establish a closer relationship 
among defendants before joining them in a single suit for patent 
infringement). 
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(3)(A) (2008). 
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an affidavit, pursuant to §1116(d)(3), attesting to the 
differences between the brand owner’s genuine products, and 
the counterfeit products. 
In the mass domain lawsuits several of these steps have 
been skipped. In these cases, the brand owners have joined in 
one lawsuit as many as several hundred different defendants 
accused of selling counterfeit products. The costs alone for 
purchasing a sample product from each defendant’s website 
would likely make it cost-prohibitive, or at least highly 
inefficient to pursue these types of suits. For example, in the 
Chanel case in the Western District of Tennessee, the 
Complaint identifies 172 defendant domain names.92 The price 
of the counterfeit goods at each of these sites ranges from 
around $50 – $450, with the average price appearing in the 
range of approximately $150.93 In addition to the very time-
consuming process of coordinating a purchase from each of 
these locations, the costs for just these purchases alone, would 
be approximately $30,000 (not including the fees for an 
investigator to perform the test purchases). 
Instead, brand owners have taken a different approach. In 
many cases, the brand owners have made only a select number 
of actual purchases. For example, Chanel’s Manager of Brand 
Protection and Enforcement submitted a declaration which 
indicated that Chanel’s independent investigator purchased 
counterfeit products from only ten of the 172 defendant 
domains that were joined in the lawsuit.94 Chanel bolstered 
this limited investigation by having its internal Manager 
analyze and assess the content and images displayed on the 
remaining 162 defendant websites.95 Based solely on this 
 
92. Complaint, Chanel, Inc. v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-cv-2684-STA-dkv 
(W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 2010). 
93. Aff. of Pilar Toro in Support of Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for 
Entry of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at Ex. 1, 
Chanel Inc. v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-cv-02684-BBD-dkv (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 
2010), available at http://servingnotice.com/oft/20%20-
%20dec%20of%20toro.pdf. 
94. Declaration of Brandon Scott in Support of Plaintiff’s Ex Parte 
Application for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction and Order Temporarily Sealing the File ¶ 4, Chanel Inc. v. Does 1-
172, No. 2:10-cv-02684-BBD-dkv (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 2010). 
95. Declaration of Brandon Scott in Support of Plaintiff’s Ex Parte 
Application for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
23
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review, the Manager concluded the websites were offering 
counterfeit products. The Manager affirmed the products were 
counterfeit based on his “visual inspection of the products, the 
pricing of the Chanel branded products listed, which are far 
below the prices of similar genuine Chanel products, and 
because I personally know Chanel does not conduct business 
with Defendants or their websites nor do they have the right or 
authority to use the Chanel Marks for any purpose.”96 
In a more traditional counterfeit context this declaration 
would be glaringly insufficient to establish that the goods being 
sold are indeed counterfeit. For example, the fact that Chanel 
does not authorize the defendant to sell the products, or that 
the products are listed below Chanel’s retail prices, does not 
take into account that the goods could be gray market (i.e., 
genuine goods manufactured by the brand owner, but sold 
through unauthorized channels), or could be goods that are 
used (second hand) and being resold on the website. 
The Manager’s visual inspection of the product images is 
likewise of limited value, because the Manager never possessed 
or inspected the actual product – only a picture that is posted 
on the website. In addition to not being able to completely 
inspect the physical sample from all angles, it fails to take 
account that the picture posted on the website may not be an 
actual representation of the product being sold. It takes little 
imagination to envision that a counterfeit website may post 
pictures of genuine Chanel products (even images copied from 
Chanel’s own website) to promote its sale of counterfeit 
products. 
A second problem exists insofar as the Manager who 
inspects the products online states that he goes through the 
steps to make a purchase, places the items in an online 
shopping cart, but does not actually complete the transaction.97 
Accordingly, the brand owner cannot verify for the Court that 
the products are actually being sold on the website.98 Seeking 
 
Injunction and Order Temporarily Sealing the File ¶¶ 11-13, Chanel Inc. v. 
Does 1-172, No. 2:10-cv-02684-BBD-dkv (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 2010). 
96. Id. ¶ 10. 
97. Id. ¶ 10. 
98. Of course, a party may be liable for infringement for merely offering 
to sell a counterfeit product; however, without an actual sale, it would seem 
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the extraordinary relief of obtaining an ex parte temporary 
restraining order and asset freeze without actually making a 
purchase from the defendant and without physically inspecting 
the product seems contrary to the strict evidentiary thresholds 
traditionally imposed by courts in evaluating whether an ex 
parte temporary restraining order is appropriate.99 
However, in the present world of online counterfeit sales, 
the website owners have solved this problem for the brand 
owners. In most instances, physical inspection of the product is 
no longer necessary. This is because the counterfeit activity on 
the Internet has become so brazen that the counterfeiters no 
longer conceal the fact that the products they sell are 
counterfeit. Indeed, as Chanel’s Manager explains in his 
declaration, many of the websites include disclaimers which 
“expressly acknowledge the Chanel branded goods sold thereon 
are ‘replica.’”100 
An example of this type of admission can be found at the 
website located at www.exactwatches.com, where the merchant 
proudly proclaims: 
Have you always wanted a fake Rolex or a 
Breitling replica but always thought it was too 
expensive for your budget or even for your taste? 
. . . Our fake Rolex watches and Breitling 
replicas are some of the best to be created by 
man. Experts say that our replicas are so 
accurate that they are hard to spot as 
“knockoffs.” This means that purchasing a $120-
watch from us will make you look like the 
wealthiest man on your street, simply because 
our replicas look so real and authentic.101 
Accordingly, in instances, such as with the website located 
at exactwatches.com, a test purchase of the counterfeit 
products has, in many respects, become redundant. The 
counterfeiters themselves have already conceded that their 
 
to present a less compelling basis for granting the extraordinary relief of an 
ex parte seizure and asset freeze. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A). 
99. See In re Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2004). 
100. Aff. of Pilar Toro, supra note 93, ¶ 10. 
101. EXACT WATCHES, http://www.exactwatches.com (last visited March 
6, 2012). 
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websites are only selling counterfeits. But for those instances 
where a website itself does not expressly admit that the 
products being sold are counterfeit, a court arguably could have 
a valid basis to refuse to issue an ex parte order of seizure 
against a defendant website, let alone hundreds of websites, 
based solely on inspection of images found on the website. 
 
 4. Directing Third Parties 
 
The temporary restraining orders and preliminary 
injunctions issued in the mass domain lawsuits are not 
directed solely at the defendants. These orders also direct third 
parties to take certain actions related to the infringing 
websites. 
For example, in the True Religion case the Court ordered 
that all banks, payment processors and financial institutions 
(including PayPal) shall freeze all financial accounts for the 
defendants or the defendants’ websites.102 The asset freeze not 
only enjoined these financial institutions from transferring any 
funds to the defendants, they also enjoined the institutions 
from providing any chargebacks or refunds to any consumers 
who (innocently or otherwise) placed orders for the counterfeit 
goods.103 
Likewise, in the Philip Morris case, the Southern District 
of Florida ordered that Western Union shall divert all money 
transfers sent to the defendants.104 In doing so, the court noted 
that Western Union was licensed to do business in the State of 
Florida, and therefore subject to jurisdiction in that district.105 
The order permitted Western Union to respond to any customer 
inquiries by advising of the pending lawsuit, and directing the 
customers to Philip Morris’ counsel who was required to 
provide the customers with a report of the status of their 
 
102. Temporary Restraining Order, Order to Disable Certain Web Sites, 
Asset Restraining Order, Expedited Discovery Order, and Order to Show 
Cause for Preliminary Injunction ¶ 11, True Religion Apparel Group, Inc. v. 
Lei, No. 1:11-cv-08242-HB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011). 
103. Id. 
104. Order Granting Application for Entry of Preliminary Injunction at 
10:9, Philip Morris USA, Inc., v. Jiang, No. 1:11-cv-24049-KMM (S.D. Fla. 
Dec. 12, 2011). 
105. Id. at 10:9 n.4. 
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transaction.106 
Well prior to the institution of these mass domain 
lawsuits, many courts, particularly in connection with 
counterfeit actions, have directed financial institutions to 
freeze a defendant’s assets. In Reebok International v. 
Marnatech Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that an 
asset freeze in a counterfeit lawsuit could be supported by 
Federal Rule 64, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116 and 1117, and the inherent 
powers of the Court.107 The Court ultimately concluded that 
“[b]ecause the Lanham Act authorizes the district court to 
grant [plaintiff] an accounting of [defendant’s] profits as a form 
of final equitable relief [under Section 1117], the district court 
had the inherent power to freeze [defendant’s] assets in order 
to ensure the availability of that final relief.”108 This same 
reasoning was adopted by the Eleventh Circuit a few years 
later in Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise International Trading.109 
The redirection of Western Union transactions pertaining 
to the defendants in the Philip Morris case, however, presents 
a deviation from the traditional counterfeit defendant asset 
freeze. First, the asset freeze is not limited to just funds that 
already reside in the defendant’s bank account. The order 
requires Western Union to continue to re-direct any monetary 
transfers that would otherwise be delivered to the 
defendants.110 
Second, in these types of cases, a counterfeit defendant is 
likely to be operating more than one counterfeit website. This 
creates the likelihood that, although some of the defendants’ 
websites may be disabled per the courts’ TRO, others are likely 
not included in the order and may continue to operate. These 
other websites presumably continue to receive monetary 
transfers through Western Union from consumer purchases 
from the non-disabled websites. Accordingly, the court’s order, 
 
106. Id. at 11:11. 
107. See Reebok Int'l, LTD. v. Marnatech Enters. Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 
558-60 (9th Cir. 1992). 
108. Id. 
109. 51 F.3d 982, 987 (11th Cir. 1995). 
110. Order Granting Application for Entry of Preliminary Injunction at 
10:9-11, Philip Morris USA, Inc., v. Jiang, No. 1:11-CV-24049-KMM (S.D. 
Fla. Dec. 12, 2011). 
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which compels redirection of all Western Union transfers to the 
defendants, as opposed to just transactions pertaining to the 
disabled websites, not only impacts assets already held in a 
defendant’s bank account, but also creates a situation whereby, 
on an ongoing basis, funds from consumer purchases from 
surviving defendant-operated counterfeit websites are re-
directed and held during the pendency of the case. In other 
words, long after the court issues a TRO, consumers visiting 
other websites owned by the defendants, may have their funds 
redirected by Western Union and seized by the court. 
In addition, several of the court orders in these mass 
domain lawsuits require the relevant registries to transfer the 
domain names to an account with GoDaddy.com, Inc., where 
they are held in trust for the Court during the pendency of the 
case, and redirected to a website that displays the pleadings 
and court filings for the lawsuit.111 
In a traditional counterfeit lawsuit, the scope of the order 
of seizure and preliminary injunction is typically limited to 
confiscation of, and an injunction pertaining to, counterfeit 
products bearing the moving plaintiff’s brands. It is firmly held 
that “[i]njunctive relief should be narrowly tailored to fit 
specific legal violations.”112 In the mass domain lawsuits, the 
courts have directed third parties to disable not only the 
portions of the infringing websites that pertain to sales of 
products bearing the brand owner’s trademarks, but the 
defendants’ entire websites, including portions of these 
websites that are dedicated to sales of products that do not use 
the moving parties’ brands (but likely infringe on other, non-
party, brands). Applied to the typical “brick and mortar” 
counterfeit action, this would be the equivalent of directing a 
landlord to lock a tenant’s entire store, without notice, and 
deposit the key with the court until the conclusion of the 
lawsuit, even if that tenant sells a variety of products that do 
not bear the plaintiff’s trademark, and are not the subject of 
 
111. Order Granting Ex Parte Application For Entry of Temporary 
Restraining Order at 7, Chanel, Inc. v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-CV-2684-BBD-
dkv (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2010). 
112. Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 220 (2d Cir. 
2003) (quoting Waldman Pub. Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 785 (2d 
Cir.1994)); see also N. Face Apparel Corp. v. TC Fashions, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 
9083 (RMB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14226 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2006). 
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the claims asserted in the lawsuit. Such an extreme form of 
relief would almost certainly garner greater scrutiny in the 
traditional “brick and mortar” context. 
The effectiveness of the domain name transfer is largely 
dependent on the case file remaining sealed until the transfer 
is complete. As explained by Chanel in the Tennessee lawsuit: 
 
 
[T]he Defendants operate Internet websites 
which they optimize for the sale of counterfeit 
Chanel merchandise. The optimization process 
provides the Defendants with their power to 
unfairly compete with Chanel by catapulting 
their illegal websites into search engine results. 
All of the optimization power which has been 
built through the illegal use of the Chanel Marks 
can easily be transferred to a new domain name 
in a matter of minutes through what is known as 
a redirect. A redirect is essentially a command 
which instructs search engines such as Google to 
transfer or redirect all traffic and the benefits 
thereof to a new domain name. . . . The only way 
to avoid the probability of successful redirects to 
evade an injunction is to secure and disable the 
domain names in advance of notice to the 
Defendants or the public.113 
The redirection of the infringing domains to a website that 
displays information regarding the pending lawsuit serves 
several functions. First, as discussed above, it provides a 
means for serving notice and process on the defendants 
regarding the seizure of their website and the filings with the 
Court. Second, perhaps the most obvious, is that it terminates 
the infringing sales and use of the counterfeit marks (at least 
at this one particular site), and disrupts the counterfeit 
defendant’s efforts to maintain a prominent presence in search 
 
113. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Chanel, Inc.’s 
Ex Parte Application for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction and Order Temporarily Sealing the File at 28-29, 
Chanel Inc. v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-cv-02684-SHM-dkv (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 21, 
2010). 
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engine results for the counterfeit goods. Third, it provides 
notice to consumers (unsuspecting or otherwise) that the 
products being offered at these websites (and by inference 
many others), are unlawful, and that brand owners, and the 
courts are taking legal measures to enjoin such activity. 
The result of these actions should not only be a deterrent 
against those who knowingly patronize these types of 
counterfeit websites, but also protection for naïve consumers, 
who may unknowingly be purchasing counterfeits, or supplying 
credit card and personal information to a phishing site. 
Finally, redirection of the counterfeit websites provides 
free access to the case file for the general public, including 
consumer watch groups, so that the arguments presented to 
the Court, and the relief being granted by the Court, may be 
closely monitored, and where appropriate, challenged. 
 
 5. Setting a Low Bond 
 
To obtain an Order permitting seizure of counterfeit goods, 
a plaintiff must post a bond.114 Section 1116(d)(4) states that 
the “court shall not grant such an application unless the person 
obtaining an order under this subsection provides the security 
determined adequate by the court for the payment of such 
damages as any person may be entitled to recover as a result of 
a wrongful seizure or wrongful attempted seizure under this 
subsection.”115 The court has discretion to determine the 
appropriate amount of a bond posted in connection with a 
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.116 In 
setting the amount of a bond, some courts maintain they 
should “err on the side of caution—that is, toward larger 
bonds—in light of the need to protect the unrepresented 
defendant, and to ensure that the defendant will have an 
effective remedy if he or she is the victim of a wrongful 
seizure.”117 
 
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4) (2006); Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya 
Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 421 (4th Cir. 1999). 
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(A) (2006). 
116. Hoechst, 174 F.3d at 421. 
117. Time Warner Entm't Co. v. Does, 876 F. Supp. 407, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 
1994) (citing 130 Cong. Rec. H12076 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (statement of 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/1
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The potential recovery for a wrongful seizure brought 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) is limited to the amount of the bond 
that is posted by the plaintiff.118 In the two Chanel cases and 
the Tiffany case discussed above, the courts required the 
plaintiffs to post a bond in the amount of $20,000.119 In the 
True Religion case, the New York court only required a bond of 
$10,000.120 And in the Philip Morris case, the court required a 
bond of $100,000.121 Given the blatant acts of counterfeiting 
complained of in each of these lawsuits, the amounts of these 
bonds, at first glance, seem reasonable. However, the 
sufficiency of the bonds must be analyzed in light of the huge 
number of defendants and domains that are joined in the single 
lawsuit. For example, in the True Religion case, an order of 
seizure was issued with regard to 86 separate defendant 
domains. Thus, each seized domain is potentially secured by 
only $116.27. The Chanel action in Las Vegas, secured by a 
$20,000 bond, identifies 399 domains.122 Here, each domain 
may be secured by only $50.12. 
Naturally, it is extremely unlikely that in a case brought 
against, for example 399 counterfeit websites, that each would 
succeed in challenging the seizure, and be entitled to a portion 
 
Rep. McCarthy)) (“Congress noted that the provision of a bond is one of the 
critical procedural protections designed to ensure that the defendant's rights 
are adequately protected during the course of an ex parte seizure.”). 
118. Blau v. YMI Jeanswear, Inc., No. CV 02-09551 FMC (SHSx), 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27432, at *22 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2003). 
119. Order Granting Application for Preliminary Injunction at 11, 
Chanel, Inc. v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-CV-2684-BBD-dkv (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 
2011); Order Granting Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for Entry of 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Chanel, Inc. v. 
The P’ships and Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Sch. “A”, 2:11-CV-1508-
KJD-PAL (D. Nev. Sept. 26, 2011); Order Granting Plaintiff’s Ex Parte 
Application for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order, Tiffany v. Does, 2:11-
CV-590-LDG-CWH (D. Nev. May 11, 2011). 
120. See Temporary Restraining Order, Order to Disable Certain Web 
Sites, Asset Restraining Order, Expedited Discovery Order and Order to 
Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction at 12, True Religion Apparel, Inc. v. 
Lei, 1:11-CV-8242-HB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011). 
121. See Order Granting Application for Entry of Preliminary Injunction 
at 11, Philip Morris v. Jiang, No. 1:11-CV-24049-KMM (S.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 
2011). 
122. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Chanel, Inc. v. The P’ships and 
Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Sch. “A”, 2:11-CV-1508-KJD-PAL (D. 
Nev. Sept. 20, 2012). 
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of the bond. However, it seems equally unlikely that the courts 
have fully considered the ramifications should this occur, 
whereby one of these defendants could be left with a mere $50 
as secured damages resulting from an improper seizure of its 
website. 
 
D. Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Mass Domain Lawsuit 
 
To date, the mass domain lawsuits have been effective in 
achieving their immediate purpose, namely to disable a large 
number of counterfeit websites and interrupt the flow of funds 
generated from these sites. Statistically, the ratio of websites 
disrupted compared to the number of mass domain lawsuits 
filed is impressive. Notwithstanding its success, it is premature 
to determine whether the mass domain lawsuit can effectively 
curtail the expansion of online counterfeit websites. 
First, the mass domain lawsuit format has yet to be 
challenged by any defendant, as all of the defendants in these 
lawsuits have defaulted (or have been dismissed) without 
posing any substantive challenge. Some of the potential 
vulnerabilities of the mass domain lawsuit format were 
highlighted in the Coach case discussed above. However, until 
a defendant attempts to defend its website, rather than default, 
it remains to be seen whether this type of lawsuit could 
ultimately withstand challenge. 
Second, although the brand owners’ success in disabling a 
large volume of websites with the filing of just a few lawsuits is 
remarkable, these efforts may be undermined if the counterfeit 
website owners can keep pace by creating new sites, or by 
redirecting old sites, to replace those that were disabled by 
these lawsuits. Given the incredibly large number of 
counterfeit websites that already exist, with new sites popping 
up every day, it is unlikely that the website owners can be out-
paced by only the mass domain lawsuits. However, hope 
remains that a brand owner, through the diligent employment 
of these mass domain lawsuits, combined with some other 
aggressive tools, including those discussed in the next section, 
can, at minimum, eliminate a counterfeiter’s incentive to 
peddle counterfeit products bearing that company’s brand. 
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III. Termination of Counterfeit Merchant Accounts Through 
Cooperation with Payment Processors 
 
Suing Doe defendants and websites en masse has thus far 
proven an efficient means of pursuing counterfeiters directly. 
However, trademark law also affords brand owners the 
potential to recover from secondary infringers who induce 
infringement or knowingly provide their services to 
counterfeiters. With internet counterfeiting largely dependent 
on credit card transactions, brand owners exploring theories of 
secondary liability are now “following the money.” This Part 
will discuss brand owners’ options for holding credit card 
associations accountable for the acts of counterfeiting 
transacted through their networks. It will also consider the 
card associations’ incentives and responsibilities for assisting 
brand owners’ efforts to disrupt counterfeiters’ businesses. 
 
A. Understanding Credit Card Transactions 
 
 1. Overview of Payment System 
 
The starting point for a brand owner seeking to hold third-
party service providers liable is to identify who are the players, 
and what are their roles. To understand the applicability of 
secondary liability in the context of credit card payment 
processing, it is necessary to distinguish the two primary 
models for credit card transactions: the Visa/MasterCard 
model, and the American Express/Discover model. In each 
model, the card association’s (i.e., Visa, American Express) 
relationships with merchants (here, the counterfeiters) and 
cardholders differ. 
The Visa/MasterCard model is known as a “four-party” 
system.123 In a four-party system, a credit card transaction 
 
123. MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, BENEFITS OF OPEN PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND 
THE ROLE OF INTERCHANGE (2008), available at 
http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/docs/BENEFITS%20OF%20ELEC
TRONIC%20PAYMENTS%20-%20US%20EDITION.pdf [hereinafter 
MASTERCARD BENEFITS] ; Visa, Inc., Visa Transaction, ABOUT VISA, 
http://corporate.visa.com/about-visa/our-business/visa-transaction.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2012); ANN KJOS, THE MERCHANT-ACQUIRING SIDE OF THE 
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involves (1) a cardholder; (2) the financial institution that 
issues the cardholder’s credit card; (3) the merchant; and (4) 
the financial institution that “acquires” the merchant’s 
account.124 The financial institutions described in (2) and (4) 
are commonly referred to as “issuing banks” and “acquiring 
banks,” respectively.125 Though it is referred to as a four-party 
system, in practice, there are often more than four parties 
involved in a credit card transaction, as the acquiring banks 
typically outsource all merchant-acquiring services other than 
financing.126 
Moreover, the designation “four-party system” does not 
count the payment network or card association involved. This 
omission likely stems from the fact that, until recently, Visa 
and MasterCard were structured as non-profit, joint ventures 
owned by the issuing and acquiring banks themselves.127 In 
their respective systems, Visa and MasterCard operate the 
payment network that allows the issuing and acquiring banks 
using that network to communicate and transmit funds in 
order to authorize, clear, and settle transactions.128 In addition 
to providing a medium for issuing and acquiring banks to 
communicate, Visa and MasterCard promulgate operating 
regulations governing use of their payment networks by their 
client financial institutions and, by imposing duties upon those 
institutions, merchants.129 Among other things, these operating 
 
PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, OPERATIONS, AND CHALLENGES 2 (2007), 
available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-cards-
center/publications/discussion-
papers/2007/D2007OctoberMerchantAcquiring.pdf (the four-party system is 
also known as an “open-loop” system, or “bank-centered payment networks”). 
124. Visa Transaction, supra note 123. 
125. KJOS, supra note 123, at 2. 
126. Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Competitive Costs of Credit Card 
Merchant Restraints (Georgetown Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper No. 
22, 2007), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fwps_papers/22. 
127. Id. at 6; United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 235 (2d 
Cir. 2003). Before going public, Visa and MasterCard’s profits were “held 
basically as security accounts, to pay merchants in the event a member bank 
defaults on a payment obligation.” Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d at 235. 
128. Payment Processing, MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, 
http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/whatwedo/payment_processing.ht
ml (last visited March 5, 2012). 
129. MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, MASTERCARD RULES, 5-1 to 5-20 (2012), 
available at http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/BM-
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regulations are designed to manage risk,130 monitor merchant 
activities, and protect the VISA and MASTERCARD brands.131 
Visa and MasterCard do not directly contract with 
cardholders or merchants. Rather, it is the issuing and 
acquiring banks, or often their own agents or third-party 
contractors, that form direct relationships with the cardholders 
and merchants.132 As part of their relationship with 
cardholders, issuing banks perform functions such as extending 
credit, issuing billing statements, and collecting payments.133 
On the merchant side, acquiring banks manage merchant 
accounts, process payments,134 and provide merchants with a 
gateway to interface with the payment network and the issuing 
banks.135 
 
 2. Anatomy of a Credit Card Transaction 
 
To better understand the four parties’ roles, it is helpful to 
consider the anatomy of a typical credit card transaction. There 
are three discrete stages in a credit card transaction: 
authorization, clearing, and settlement. Authorization occurs 
 
Entire_Manual_public.pdf [hereinafter MASTERCARD RULES]; VISA, VISA 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATING REGULATIONS 400-17 (2012), available at 
http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-international-operating-
regulations-main.pdf. 
130. Acquiring banks and issuing banks bear different types of risk. 
Ramon P. DeGennaro, Merchant Acquirers and Payment Card Processors: A 
Look Inside the Black Box, 91 FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV. 27, 34-
37 (2006), available at 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/erq106_degennaro.pdf. An issuing 
bank, which extends credit to cardholders, bears the risk of the cardholder 
defaulting on payment. Id. Acquiring banks bear risk with respect to 
transactions disputed by cardholders, also known as “chargebacks.” Id. In the 
case of a chargeback, the acquiring bank indemnifies the issuing bank (who 
indemnifies the cardholder) for the purchase price; if the merchant has 
inadequate funds to cover the chargeback, the acquiring bank is left holding 
the bag. Id. 
131. MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 129, at 4-1 to 4-2; VISA, supra note 
129, at 104. 
132. KJOS, supra note 123, at 2-3. 
133. DeGennaro, supra note 130, at 31. 
134. See id. Some, often larger, acquirers process payments themselves; 
others, often smaller, resell the processing services of third parties. Id. 
135. Id. 
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before any funds are actually transmitted between banks, 
consisting of the approval or denial of a proposed 
transaction.136 During clearing and settlement, funds are 
transmitted between banks, the cardholder is billed, and bank 
and network fees are deducted from the amount remitted to the 
merchant.137 
A transaction begins with the cardholder swiping her card 
at a merchant’s payment terminal, or submitting her card 
information through a website. The terminal (or website) 
transmits the cardholder’s information to the acquiring bank. 
Next, the acquiring bank submits this information into the 
payment network, which then routes the information to the 
cardholder’s issuing bank. After receiving the card information 
and querying the cardholder’s account, if approved, the issuing 
bank transmits an authorization through the payment network 
back to the initiating acquiring bank. The acquiring bank 
forwards the authorization to the merchant, permitting the 
transaction to go forward.138 This ends the authorization stage. 
Though at this point the buyer has already left with her 
goods (or has perhaps received a purchase and delivery 
confirmation by email), the back-end processes of clearance and 
settlement continue. To initiate these processes, the merchant 
must submit its transactions to its acquiring bank to begin 
clearance and settlement – the point at which funds are 
deposited into the merchant’s account for the purchased goods, 
and the participating parties make their money. Upon receipt 
of transaction information, the issuing bank will bill the 
appropriate cardholder’s account with the purchase amount, 
and remit the purchase amount, less the “interchange fee” 
prescribed by the card association, through the payment 
network. As the funds make their way to the acquiring bank, 
the card association will deduct an “assessment fee” for its own 
services, and pass on the remainder to the acquiring bank.139 
 
136. Visa Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Nov. 19, 2010), 
available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1403161/000119312510265236/d10k.
htm. 
137. Id. 
138. KJOS, supra note 123, at 4-5. 
139. Id. at 20. 
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Likewise, the acquiring bank deducts a fee of its own, and 
credits the merchant’s account with what remains. Together, 
the interchange fee retained by the issuing bank, the 
assessments fee retained by the card association, and acquiring 
fee retained by the acquiring bank comprise the “merchant 
discount fee.”140 
 
 3. The Three-Party System 
 
In contrast, American Express and Discover operate under 
a “three-party system,”141 or “closed” network.142 The primary 
difference from the Visa/MasterCard model is that in the three-
party system used by American Express and Discover, “the 
generally independent functions of issuers, acquirers, and 
networks that exist in the Visa/MasterCard models are 
collapsed into one entity.”143 That is, unlike Visa and 
MasterCard, American Express and Discover not only manage 
the payment network, but traditionally also play the role of 
issuing bank and acquiring bank, forming direct contractual 
relationships with cardholders and merchants to use and 
accept their payment cards.144 To the average cardholder, the 
difference between three- and four-party systems may seem 
academic. But for purposes of a card association’s exposure to 
contributory liability for merchants’ infringements, the 
distinction may be critical. 
 
B. Contributory Liability and Payment Processors 
 
In two prominent cases, brand owners have sought to have 
card associations, acquiring banks, and/or payment processors 
answer for the infringements of the merchants they serve. 
Because they are processing payments, not peddling 
counterfeit goods themselves, the theories of liability advanced 
against participants in credit card payment processing center 
 
140. Id. at 20-21. 
141. MASTERCARD BENEFITS, supra note 123, at 3. 
142. United States v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 333 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
143. KJOS, supra note 123, at 3. 
144. KJOS, supra note 123, at 3; Levitin, supra note 126, at 7. 
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on the doctrines of vicarious and contributory trademark 
infringement. A vicarious infringer is “one who has an 
apparent or actual partnership with the infringer or who 
exercises joint ownership or control over the infringing 
product.”145 In contrast, contributory liability extends to those 
who “knowingly cooperate in illegal and tortuous activity.”146 
Though plaintiffs have advanced both theories of secondary 
liability (as well as unsuccessful claims for direct infringement) 
against participants in credit card payment processing, for 
purposes of this article, the discussion of card networks’ 
potential liability will be limited to the doctrine of contributory 
liability. 
 
 1. Development of Contributory Liability for Service 
Providers 
 
The recent extension (and attempted extension) of 
contributory liability to service providers, and particularly to 
participants in credit card payment processing, has its roots in 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Ives Laboratories., Inc.147 Inwood involved a dispute between 
two prescription drug manufacturers. Inwood allegedly sold its 
generic drug in identically colored capsules as Ives, inducing 
pharmacists to mislabel Inwood’s generic drug with Ives’ 
registered trademark, CYCLOSPASMOL.148 On this basis, Ives 
sued Inwood for trademark infringement. The district court 
denied Ives’ request for a preliminary injunction, and in a 
bench trial, entered judgment for the defendant, Inwood.149 The 
Second Circuit reversed, finding Inwood liable for contributory 
 
145. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 25:22 (4th ed. 2011). 
146. Id. § 25:17. 
147. 456 U.S. 844 (1982). Inwood was not the Supreme Court’s first 
exposure to secondary liability. For a discussion of pre-Inwood contributory 
liability case law, see Charles W. Adams, Indirect Infringement from a Tort 
Law Perspective, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 635, 675-77 (2008). 
148. 456 U.S. at 850. 
149. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. 939 (E.D.N.Y. 
1978), aff’d, 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979) (denying preliminary injunction); 
Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 488 F. Supp. 394, 397-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) 
(denying Ives’ claim for contributory trademark infringement under Lanham 
Act § 32), rev’d, 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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trademark infringement.150 
The Supreme Court then reversed the Second Circuit’s 
decision, finding that the trial court’s denial of Ives’ 
contributory infringement claim was not clearly erroneous.151 
However, the Supreme Court confirmed that a manufacturer 
could be held liable even where it did not “directly control” 
pharmacists who mislabeled the drug with another’s 
trademark.152 The Court articulated a two-pronged doctrine of 
contributory liability, where a manufacturer or distributor 
could be found contributorily liable if it “intentionally induces 
another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its 
product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is 
engaging in trademark infringement.”153 
A decade later, Inwood was applied outside of the 
manufacturer/distributor and “product” contexts. The United 
States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuit, 
drawing upon the tort law concept of premises liability, held 
that operators of flea markets and swap meets could be held 
contributorily liable for the trademark infringements 
committed by vendors on their premises.154 And just a few 
years thereafter, the Ninth Circuit decided what has become 
the seminal case in extending Inwood’s concept of contributory 
liability to service providers: Lockheed Martin v. Network 
Solutions, Inc.155 
In Lockheed, the defendant was a domain name 
registrar.156 The plaintiff, owner of the service mark SKUNK 
WORKS had notified the defendant of domain name 
 
150. 638 F.2d at 540. 
151. 456 U.S. at 858. Because the Second Circuit did not consider Ives’ 
unfair competition claims under § 43(a) and state law, the Supreme Court 
remanded these issues. Id. at 859. 
152. Id. at 853-54. 
153. Id. at 854 (citing William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 
U.S. 526 (1924); Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F.Supp. 980 
(Mass. 1946), aff'd, 162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809 
(1947)). 
154. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 
1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992) (contributory liability may attach to flea market 
operator); accord, Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (swap meet operator). 
155. 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999). 
156. Id. at 982. 
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registrations containing its service mark or confusingly similar 
variations, demanded that the domains be cancelled, and 
demanded that the defendant refuse to register any like 
domains in the future.157 When the defendant did not comply, 
the plaintiff sued for contributory infringement, as well as 
other claims under the Lanham Act.158 
Because the defendant registrar provided to the third-
party infringers a service, rather than a product, the case did 
not fit neatly within the Inwood mold. Building upon the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hard Rock, and its own in 
Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit adapted the second prong of the 
Inwood test to the context of service providers.159 In 
determining whether a service provider would be held liable for 
contributory infringement, the Court looked to “the extent of 
control exercised by the defendant over the third party’s means 
of infringement.”160 The Court concluded that contributory 
liability would arise where the service provider exercised 
“[d]irect control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by 
a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark.”161 Ultimately, the 
defendant’s rote translation of domain names into 
corresponding internet protocol addresses was insufficient to 
warrant a finding of contributory liability.162 
 
 2. Application of Contributory Infringement Doctrine to 
Payment Processors 
 
  a. Perfect 10 v. Visa International Service Association 
 
The Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to apply the 
Lockheed standard directly to payment processors and card 
associations in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International Service 
 
157. Id. at 982-83. 
158. Id. at 983. 
159. Id. at 984-85. 
160. Id. at 984 (citing Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession 
Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
161. Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 984. The Lockheed standard’s requirement of 
“control” has been criticized as an incorrect application of vicarious liability 
concepts to the realm of contributory liability. See Adams, supra note 147, at 
681-82. 
162. Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 984-85. 
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Association.163 In that case, the plaintiff, the publisher of a 
subscription website providing photographs of nude models 
brought claims for contributory trademark infringement 
against the card associations, Visa and MasterCard, as well as 
an acquiring bank and payment processor.164 The plaintiff 
alleged that after receiving notice of third-party’s unauthorized 
distribution of plaintiff’s copyrighted images (which copies also 
bore the PERFECT 10 trademark), the defendants continued to 
process payments for those third parties.165 Applying the test 
devised in Lockheed, the district court dismissed all of the 
plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6),166 and the plaintiff 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
In affirming the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s 
claims, the majority agreed that the plaintiff failed to plead 
sufficient facts to support a contributory infringement claim 
under the Lockheed standard. The widespread use of credit 
cards for Internet transactions was not lost on the majority, 
which acknowledged that “credit cards serve as the primary 
engine of electronic commerce.”167 Nevertheless, the majority 
did not consider the infringement – unauthorized distribution – 
to be dependent on the direct infringers’ ability to accept credit 
card payments; that is, the infringing photographs could be 
distributed whether or not a sale was completed using a credit 
card, or at all.168 This led the majority to the critical (and for 
 
163. 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007). 
164. Id. at 793. 
165. Id. 
166. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1736 (N.D. 
Cal. 2004). 
167. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
168. Id. at 807. In reaching its conclusions as to the instrumentality of 
infringement for purposes of contributory trademark infringement, the 
majority incorporates (without reference) its rationale “[a]s discussed at 
length above.” Id. The most reasonable interpretation is that the majority is 
referring to prior statements made in the context of contributory copyright 
infringement, such as “Perfect 10 has not alleged that any infringing material 
passes over Defendants’ payment networks or through their payment 
processing systems,” and “[w]hile Perfect 10 has alleged that Defendants 
make it easier for websites to profit from this infringing activity, the issue 
here is reproduction, alteration, display and distribution, which can occur 
without payment.” Id. at 796 (emphasis added). These statements coincide 
with the majority’s view that the payment network is neither involved in nor 
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plaintiff, fatal) holding that it was the infringing websites, not 
the defendants’ payment network, or any combination of the 
two, that was the “instrumentality used to infringe the 
plaintiff’s mark.”169 Having thus defined the instrumentality of 
infringement, the Court continued to note that the defendant 
card associations and payment processors were not alleged to 
have “the power to remove infringing material from these 
websites or directly stop their distribution over the Internet.”170 
While the defendants did have the ability to cease processing 
payments, which might stop or reduce the infringements (or 
might not, as the majority stressed throughout its opinion171), 
the defendants did not exercise the “direct control” over the 
instrumentality, as required by Lockheed.172 
Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski wrote an impassioned dissent 
in Perfect 10, arguing that because “credit cards are directly 
involved in every infringing transaction,” the defendants 
effectively “control whether such transactions will go 
forward.”173 Where the majority sought to divorce the “means of 
payment” from the “mechanics of transferring the material,” 
Kozinski colorfully argued that “[i]n a commercial 
environment, distribution and payment are . . . like love and 
marriage-you can’t have one without the other.”174 This, Judge 
Kozinski believed, was control enough for the plaintiff to 
satisfy the Lockheed test and survive a motion to dismiss.175 
(However, Judge Kozinski did note that, given the defendants’ 
differing roles in processing payments, the ultimate question of 
liability could turn on whether the defendants had direct 
 
essential to the alleged infringements. 
169. Id. at 807. 
170. Id. 
171. See, e.g., id. at 796, 798, 807. 
172. Id. at 807. Among the criticisms of Perfect 10 is the majority’s 
failure to distinguish between the card association defendants, the acquiring 
bank defendant, and processor defendant – all of whose relationships to the 
direct infringers differ. See, e.g., id. at 811 n.2 (noting “simplifying 
assumptions” used by majority); Kelly K. Yang, Paying for Infringement: 
Implicating Credit Card Networks in Secondary Trademark Liability, 26 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 687, 706-10 (2011). 
173. 494 F.3d at 821 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
174. Id. at 818 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
175. Id. at 822 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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relationships with the infringing merchants).176 The Kozinski 
dissent would be influential the next time contributory 
infringement claims were levied against payment processors. 
 
  b. Gucci v. Frontline Processing Corp. 
 
Where Perfect 10 marked an outright victory for payment 
processors, the Southern District of New York’s recent decision 
in Gucci America, Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp.177 
introduces uncertainty. In Frontline, luxury goods 
manufacturer Gucci America, Inc., having first obtained 
judgment against “Laurette,” an internet seller of replica 
GUCCI products,178 brought suit against two acquiring banks 
and/or payment processors,179 Frontline Processing Corp. and 
Woodforest National Bank, as well as Durango Merchant 
Services LLC, an alleged agent aiding the processors in 
locating merchants.180 
The three named defendants were alleged to have supplied 
credit card processing services for Laurette, enabling sales of 
counterfeit goods through the website TheBagAddiction.com.181 
Durango was found to have “specializ[ed] in services for ‘High 
Risk Merchant Accounts’”182 such as sellers of replica goods.183 
 
176. Id. at 811 n.2 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). This observation suggests 
the possibility of different outcomes between card associations and acquiring 
banks/payment processors in four-party systems, as well as between card 
associations in four-party and three-party systems (e.g., Visa and 
MasterCard). 
177. 721 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
178. See Gucci America, Inc. v. Laurette Co., No. 08-cv-5065 (LAK) 
(S.D.N.Y. Jun. 3, 2008). 
179. See Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d at 239 n.3 (“Neither 
party has provided sufficiently clear terminology to describe Woodforest or 
Frontline. For the purposes of this opinion, terms like ‘acquiring bank’ and 
‘credit card processors’ are intended to have the same meaning and do not 
imply anything about their services beyond what is alleged in the 
complaint.”). 
180. Id. at 238. 
181. Id. at 239. 
182. Id. at 238. It is not uncommon for those catering to high-risk 
merchants to specifically reference “replica products” in their literature. See, 
e.g., PAINLESS PROCESSING, http://www.painlessprocessing.com/replica-
merchant-account.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (“We at Painless Processing 
specialize in getting our clients approval for high risk merchant accounts 
43
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In providing these services to Laurette, Durango allegedly 
devised a system designed to aid Laurette in avoiding 
chargebacks, which the court construed as “‘affirmative steps 
taken to foster infringement.’”184 The court concluded that, as 
to Durango, Gucci had sufficiently pleaded a claim for relief 
under the inducement prong of Inwood.185 
The district court, noting that the Second Circuit had not 
adopted Lockheed – or what it deemed the modified part of the 
Inwood test – nevertheless found it a “persuasive synthesis” for 
adjudging allegations of contributory trademark infringement 
against service providers such as Frontline and Woodforest.186 
However, the court set forth an arguably relaxed version of the 
Lockheed test, assessing contributory liability by evaluating 
whether Frontline and Woodforest “knowingly supplied 
services to websites and had sufficient control over infringing 
activity to merit liability.”187 
Frontline and Woodforest’s knowledge of Laurette’s 
infringement was established by their involvement in 
reviewing Laurette’s website and investigating consumer 
 
including replica merchant accounts.”); REPLICA MERCHANT ACCOUNTS, 
MerchantAccount-highrisk.com, http://merchantaccount-highrisk.com/replica-
merchant-account.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (“Need a merchant account 
for a replica merchandise business? Then you need a high risk, replica 
merchant account . . . .We can enable you to process payments.”); When a 
Web-Based Business Needs Replica Merchant Account, GSPAY.COM, 
http://www.gspay.com/when-a-web-based-business-needs-replica-merchant-
account.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (“Online merchant account will give 
you complete independence. It will help make your web replica business more 
successful and profitable. . . . Boost the potential of your business with replica 
merchant account!”). 
183. 721 F. Supp. 2d at 238. 
184. Id. at 249. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 248 (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 
463, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)); see also Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 
105-06 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We therefore assume without deciding that Inwood’s 
test for contributory trademark infringement governs.”). 
187. 721 F. Supp. 2d at 248 (emphasis added); The court reiterates the 
standard as requiring sufficient control. Id. at 249. The court later states that 
“[p]laintiff provides sufficient factual allegations to establish a claim that 
Woodforest and Frontline had some control over the directly infringing third-
party, but fails to provide enough facts to show control on the part of 
Durango.” Id. at 251 (emphasis added). 
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chargebacks for items purchased from TheBagAddiction.com.188 
As to the control element, the court defined the instrumentality 
of infringement as “the combination of the website and the 
credit card network, since both are allegedly necessary 
elements for the infringing act.”189 The court draws heavily 
from Judge Kozinski’s dissent in Perfect 10 to establish the 
interconnectedness of the website and payment network, 
reasoning that “[i]f, as Gucci alleges, the Laurette website was 
functionally dependent upon Woodforest and Frontline’s credit 
card processing services to sell counterfeit Gucci products, it 
would be sufficient to demonstrate the control needed for 
liability.”190 
Interestingly, the Frontline court follows Judge Kozinski’s 
reasoning in holding that distribution and payment are 
inseparable (like love and marriage), while also accepting, or at 
least not explicitly rejecting, the Perfect 10 majority’s 
conclusion that the two may be separable.191 In so holding, the 
Frontline court distinguishes Perfect 10: “the infringing conduct 
[in Perfect 10] was the publication on the website of 
trademarked images of nude models, and the distribution 
occurred via individuals viewing and taking the image directly 
from the website.”192 If Perfect 10 and Frontline are to be read 
as consistent with one another, it would seem that the different 
outcomes hinge on whether the directly infringing product is 
non-rivalrous (Perfect 10) or rivalrous (Frontline).193 That is, it 
is conceivable that the Perfect 10 infringers could continue to 
distribute free electronic copies of the infringing photos, as 
doing so would not impair their ability to meet paying 
customers’ demand for electronic copies. In contrast, because 
the Frontline direct infringer, Laurette, dealt in physical goods, 
it would be far less likely to distribute products without a 
functional payment network. 
 
188. Id. at 249-50. 
189. Id. at 252. 
190. Id. at 253. 
191. Id. at 252. 
192. Id. 
193. Eric Goldman, Payment Service Providers May Be Liable for 
Counterfeit Website Sales--Gucci v. Frontline, ERIC GOLDMAN TECH. & 
MARKETING L. BLOG (June 29, 2010, 12:19 PM), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/06/payment_service.htm. 
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Thus, Gucci was able to defeat a motion to dismiss its 
claims for contributory infringement against Durango 
(inducement theory) and Frontline and Woodforest (knowing 
supply of services theory). However, Frontline did not result in 
a finding of contributory liability against any of the defendants, 
since the parties settled out of court.194 But in finding that 
Gucci had stated claims for contributory infringement against 
the defendant payment processor, acquiring bank, and agent, 
Frontline introduces uncertainty for payment processors as to 
their legal obligations and potential liabilities. Frontline 
suggests that card networks such as American Express and 
Discover, which themselves perform the functions performed by 
acquiring banks in four-party systems may be susceptible to 
claims for contributory liability for the infringements of their 
merchants. Frontline even leaves open the possibility of 
liability for card associations such as Visa and MasterCard, 
despite their lack of direct relationships with infringing 
merchants. 
 
C. Credit Card Associations’ Cooperation with Brand Owners 
 
 1. Card Associations’ Voluntary Anti-Counterfeiting 
Policies 
 
Card associations have incentives for keeping unsavory or 
criminal merchants from plying their trade through the 
associations’ payment networks. In some cases, as with 
internet gambling, the incentive is to avoid indirect liability 
under the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act 
(UIGEA)195 by “establish[ing] and implement[ing] written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and 
block or otherwise prevent or prohibit” use of the payment 
networks for internet gambling.196 
 
194. Final Order and Judgment on Consent at 1-2, Gucci America, Inc. 
v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-cv-
6925), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nysdce/1:2009cv06925/350358/90/0.pdf?ts=1286286153. 
195. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361 – 5367 (2006)). 
196. 12 C.F.R. § 233.5(a) (2009). For a discussion of the UIGEA and the 
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Even where the law might not impose such a direct duty, 
Visa and MasterCard – brand owners themselves – have 
incentives to protect the goodwill embodied by their 
trademarks. To that end, both card associations impose duties 
on their acquiring banks to restrict merchant activity. For 
example, MasterCard prohibits “[i]llegal or [b]rand-damaging 
transactions,” including “[t]he sale or offer of sale of a product 
or service other than in full compliance with the law.”197 
Likewise, Visa’s Operating Regulations prohibit use of the Visa 
network for illegal activities which include, but are not limited 
to, child pornography, money laundering or financing terrorist 
activities.198 Though it presumably falls within each card 
association’s definition of “illegal” transactions,199 the sale of 
counterfeit goods is not explicitly mentioned in either card 
association’s rules. 
Despite the absence of an explicit prohibition on 
merchants’ trafficking in counterfeit goods, both Visa and 
MasterCard have policies in place that allow brand owners to 
notify the card associations of websites that accept, or purport 
to accept, their payment cards to purchase counterfeit goods. 
So, rather than sue, brand owners can seek Visa and 
MasterCard’s assistance in cutting off payment processing 
services to websites selling counterfeit goods by submitting 
reports of intellectual property infringement. For reports 
submitted to Visa and MasterCard, brand owners must provide 
a description of the alleged violation, provide their contact 
information (and that of their agent, if applicable), identify the 
 
system adopted by card networks to identify and block internet gambling 
transactions, see Mark MacCarthy, What Payment Intermediaries Are Doing 
About Online Liability and Why It Matters, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1037, 
1062-66 (2010). 
197. MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, MASTERCARD RULES § 5.11.7 (Feb. 24, 
2012), available at http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/BM-
Entire_Manual_public.pdf. 
198. VISA, VISA INTERNAL OPERATING REGULATIONS 786 (Apr. 15, 2012), 
available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-international-
operating-regulations-main.pdf [hereinafter VISA OPERATING]. 
199. Sales of counterfeit goods have been identified as a source of income 
for terrorist organizations. Counterfeit Goods are Linked to Terror Groups - 
Business - International Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-
fake.4569452.html. 
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intellectual property that is allegedly infringed, and provide 
the allegedly infringing merchant’s name, website, and 
country, if available.200 On this last point – identifying the 
merchant – it is sufficient to provide Visa and MasterCard with 
the domain name of the infringing site, and the registrant’s 
contact information contained in the Whois record for that 
domain name. Of course, there must also be a basis for 
believing that a reported website accepts the relevant type of 
credit card, which can be satisfied by a screenshot or a 
representation that the website claims to accept VISA or 
MASTERCARD credit cards. 
Upon receipt of a report of intellectual property 
infringement, the card association will conduct a test 
transaction for each identified website. This allows the card 
association to verify that the website does in fact transact 
business over its payment network, and to identify the 
acquiring bank handling the merchant account. The card 
association will then instruct the acquiring bank to investigate 
the activities of the merchant associated with the website.201 In 
the Visa and MasterCard networks, presuming the acquiring 
bank determines that a violation has occurred and absent 
“compelling” evidence to the contrary, the bank is expected to 
terminate the merchant account,202 and enter the merchant’s 
information into the MATCH system so that other acquiring 
banks may be notified of the merchant’s past transgressions.203 
 
200. Intellectual Property Rights, VISA INC., 
http://corporate.visa.com/about-visa/security-and-trust/intellectual-property-
rights.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2012) [hereinafter VISA IP]. 
201. See, e.g., id.; MasterCard Anti-Piracy Policy, MASTERCARD 
WORLDWIDE, http://www.mastercard.com/us/wce/PDF/MasterCard_Anti-
Piracy_Policy.pdf [hereinafter MasterCard Anti-Piracy). 
202. MasterCard Anti-Piracy, supra note 201. 
203. MATCH stands for “Member Alert to Control High-Risk 
(Merchants).” MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, SECURITY RULES AND PROCEDURES: 
MERCHANT EDITION 11-i (Feb. 24, 2012), available 
at http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/SPME-
Entire_Manual_public.pdfhttp://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/SPME
-Entire_Manual_public.pdf. MATCH is a database containing information 
about terminated merchants, including name, address and other identifiable 
information. Under both the Visa and MasterCard systems, acquiring banks 
are required to consult MATCH as part of their investigation into potential 
merchants. Id. at 11-5http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/SPME-
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The results of the investigation (e.g., claiming that a merchant 
account has been terminated) are then reported to the brand 
owner who submitted the complaint. 
In the absence of any legislation or case law that 
unequivocally imposes on the card associations a duty to 
monitor their payment networks to prevent counterfeit 
transactions, the above-described policies may be considered 
“voluntary.” However, one can reasonably presume that these 
voluntary anti-counterfeiting policies are in part defensive, 
aimed at staving off lawsuits and potential adverse judicial 
decisions imposing secondary liability, and providing a basis 
for card associations to argue to legislators that legislation 
(such as that discussed in Part IV) is unnecessary.204 But 
whatever the reason, or the degree of volition, card associations 
presently appear willing to assist brand owners in combating 
online infringement. 
The recent evolution of the card associations’ policies 
seems to support the view that they are a reaction to pending 
legislation and/or the Frontline decision. In September 2009, 
the International Trademark Association (INTA) released 
“Addressing the Sale of Counterfeits on the Internet,” a 
document setting forth voluntary best practices for brand 
owners and “Payment Service Providers” (PSPs) in jointly 
combating online counterfeit sales.205 In addition to providing 
the PSP with information such as the infringing URL, and 
proof of the brand owner’s intellectual property rights, these 
best practices contemplated imposing on brand owners the 
duty to complete a purchase from the alleged counterfeiter, and 
 
Entire_Manual_public.pdfhttp://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-
international-operating-regulations-main.pdf, VISA OPERATING, supra note 
198, at 852-54. Acquiring banks are required to input into MATCH 
information regarding merchants who are terminated as a result of brand 
owners’ intellectual property reports. See, e.g., MasterCard Anti-Piracy 
Policy, supra note 201. 
204. Yang, supra note 172, at 719. 
205. INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION, ADDRESSING THE SALE OF 
COUNTERFEITS ON THE INTERNET (Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/INTA%20Best%20Practices%20for
%20Addressing%20the%20Sale%20of%20Counterfeits%20on%20the%20Inter
net.pdf. 
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to agree to indemnify206 the PSP for any liabilities incurred 
from terminating services to a merchant based on the brand 
owner’s complaint.207 Until recently, Visa required the brand 
owner to make a purchase from the alleged infringer in order to 
identify the acquiring bank. For its part, MasterCard required 
the brand owner’s agreement to indemnify MasterCard, plus to 
pay a per-URL fee. None of these requirements exist under 
MasterCard or Visa’s current policies.208 To the extent that the 
cost of conducting purchases, or reservations about providing 
indemnity, dissuaded brand owners from working with the 
card associations’ voluntary policies, these requirements are no 
longer obstacles. 
Card associations and payment processors have also 
evinced a willingness to assist brand owners in other ways. For 
example, Visa International, Visa Europe, MasterCard, 
PayPal, and American Express have all signed on to participate 
in the International Anticounterfeiting Coalition’s (IACC) 
“payment processor portal.”209 The IACC “portal,” which 
 
206. Among other things, the call for indemnification arises out of Visa’s 
experience with the Russian website AllofMP3.com. Acting upon a complaint 
that AllofMP3.com provided unauthorized downloads of copyrighted music to 
consumers in whose jurisdictions such downloads were infringing, Visa 
advised the Russian acquiring bank to terminate the Visa merchant account. 
The merchant then sued the acquirer for breach of the merchant agreement, 
Visa intervened in the suit on behalf of the acquirer, and a Russian court 
decided in favor of the merchant, ordering that the bank and network 
continue processing payments. This example of the application of sometimes 
incongruous national laws to global transactions is one way that card 
associations are exposed to potential liability in acting upon brand and 
content owner’s infringement complaints. See Targeting Websites Dedicated 
To Stealing American Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 7-9 (2011) (statement of Denise Yee, Visa Inc.); 
MacCarthy, supra note 196, at 1093-95. 
207. Targeting Websites Dedicated To Stealing American Intellectual 
Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 6 (2011) 
(statement of Denise Yee, Visa Inc.). 
208. MasterCard Anti-Piracy Policy, supra note 201; VISA IP, supra note 
200. However, indemnity has not been totally abandoned, and may still be 
required where, in investigating complaints of infringement, “undue risk will 
be shifted to Visa were [Visa] to decide in favor of the intellectual property 
owner.” Targeting Websites Dedicated To Stealing American Intellectual 
Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 14 
(2011) (statement of Denise Yee, Visa Inc.). 
209. Int’l Anticounterfeiting Coal., Address at LVMH Tower Regarding 
IACC Payment Processor Portal (Oct. 12, 2011). 
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launched in early January 2012, is a web-based tool which 
allows participating brand owners to submit a single report of 
infringement to all participating payment processors.210 In 
theory, the IACC portal should increase efficiency by obviating 
the need for brand owners to submit a separate complaint to 
each payment processor, and by reducing redundancies, such 
as where a processor must act on multiple complaints from 
different brand owners concerning the same URL.211 However, 
unlike the card associations’ individual policies, use of the 
IACC portal is not open to the public.212 The IACC assesses an 
annual fee for access to the portal213 which, of course, must be 
factored into brand owners’ cost-benefit analysis. Finally, the 
third party retained to administer the IACC portal boasts 
numerous financial institutions among its existing clients, and 
brand owners contemplating using the IACC portal should 
keep in mind this shared loyalty.214 
 
 2. Working with the Card Associations 
 
On behalf of several brand owners, the authors of this 
article have used the infringement reporting policies 
implemented by Visa and MasterCard. This process has 
produced mixed results. Visa and MasterCard have provided 
timely responses to the reports, typically within two weeks 
(though this timeframe may vary depending on the number of 
websites identified in a report), resulting in the termination of 
dozens of merchant accounts associated with counterfeiting 
websites. And in no case has the associated acquiring bank 
refused to terminate an identified merchant. 
While the card association policies do result in the 
termination of counterfeiters’ merchant accounts, these 
represent a fairly small percentage of the overall number of 
websites reported. This is because the majority of websites 
reported do not actually process payments through the credit 
card networks advertised on their sites, and are in that respect 
 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
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“inactive.”215 That is, although the reported URLs resolve to a 
functional website, complete with product listings, shopping 
carts, and, of course, the card associations’ logos, it is often 
impossible to complete a credit card transaction. This inactivity 
takes two forms: (1) the website is inactive, in that a purchase 
cannot be completed because the website is not working 
properly, despite all appearances; or (2) the merchant is 
inactive, such that, although a transaction may be authorized, 
the transaction is not submitted by the merchant into the 
payment system for clearing and settlement.216 Surprisingly, 
an overwhelming majority of sites most highly ranked (i.e., on 
the first few pages) in search engines’ organic results over a 
period of 1-2 months have proven “inactive” upon investigation. 
Though the high incidence of inactive websites was unexpected, 
it was encouraging to learn that while such web sites may 
attract consumers, these attractions cannot end in completed 
sales of counterfeit product. 
Of course, a finding of inactivity does not guarantee that a 
website cannot resume actively accepting credit card payments 
by obtaining a new account with a different acquiring bank. 
And because there is no visible indication that activity has 
resumed – the merchant does not flip on a neon sign to signal 
that it is now “ACTIVE” – constant monitoring of the site is 
required. Card associations have thus far been amenable to re-
testing sites previously deemed inactive, and our results seem 
to show that, in most cases, sites deemed inactive have 
remained inactive. Nevertheless, the constant vigilance 
required to routinely monitor inactive sites and take action 
against newly registered or discovered websites will lead to 
ever-increasing watch lists for brand owners. To help alleviate 
this burden, enforcement through card associations’ voluntary 
policies should be coupled with enforcement efforts that result 
in the websites being seized or otherwise made inaccessible to 
 
215. As used throughout this section, the terms “active” and “inactive” 
will refer to the ability and inability, respectively, to accept a credit card for 
purchases. 
216. In some instances, these sites may be phishing sites, designed 
solely to misappropriate a consumer’s personal and credit card information. A 
consumer may believe he is inputting his credit card information to make a 
purchase, but instead has transmitted personal and financial information to 
a criminal. 
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consumers. The mass domain lawsuits discussed in Part II 
provide a viable option for taking down counterfeiting sites on 
a large scale, provided the joinder and jurisdictional questions 
they raise can withstand the scrutiny of the courts, and 
potential challenges by defendants. And to the extent that they 
would allow brand owners to affect not only counterfeiters’ 
ability to process payments, but also the accessibility of 
counterfeiters’ sites, legislation of the type described in Part IV 
(putting aside the constitutional and other concerns raised by 
opponents) might serve as an effective supplement to, or 
replacement for, the card associations’ voluntary policies. 
 
IV. Legislation Directed Towards Online Piracy and 
Counterfeits 
 
As brand owners attempt to deal with the problem of 
online counterfeiting through the courts and through 
cooperative efforts with credit card associations, lawmakers 
have been crafting their own solution. Three recent bills in the 
Senate and House of Representatives have attempted to 
address online counterfeiting and piracy. The first, the 
Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act 
(COICA),217 was introduced on September 20, 2010 by Senator 
Patrick Leahy of Vermont, but was quickly stalled in the 
Senate and expired at the close of the then-current 
Congressional session. But Senator Leahy was not to be 
deterred. The following session, Senator Leahy introduced the 
successor to COICA, the Preventing Real Online Threats to 
Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 
2011, also known as the PROTECT IP Act, or PIPA.218 
Meanwhile, Representative Lamar Smith of Texas introduced a 
 
217. Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act (COICA), S. 
3804, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter COICA I]. Roughly two months later, 
Senator Leahy introduced an amended version of COICA. Combating Online 
Infringement and Counterfeits Act, S. 3804, 111th Cong. (as amended by 
Senate, Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter COICA II]. 
218. Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft 
of Intellectual Property Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter 
PIPA]. An amended version was reported 2 weeks later. Preventing Real 
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act 
of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (as amended by Senate, May 26, 2011). 
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bill of his own – the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA)219 – in the 
House of Representatives. 
Though by no means identical, COICA, PIPA and SOPA 
can be considered variations on a common theme, each at its 
core proposing a framework allowing the Attorney General, 
and, in the case of PIPA and SOPA, brand and copyright 
owners, to combat online counterfeiting and piracy through 
intermediaries whose services enable infringing websites to ply 
their trade. Notwithstanding their differing terminologies, each 
proposed to reach four key categories of intermediaries: (1) 
search engines (e.g., Google and Yahoo!); (2) internet 
advertising services (e.g., Google Adwords); (3) payment 
processors (e.g., Visa and MasterCard); and (4) and internet 
service providers (e.g., Verizon, Comcast). By exploiting 
counterfeiters’ dependence on these intermediaries for survival, 
the bills’ sponsors and supporters hoped to provide brand 
owners with new, effective tools for combating online 
counterfeiting. 
 
A. Summary of the Bills 
 
COICA, PIPA, and SOPA share a similar basic framework 
for combating online infringement. Under each bill, 
counterfeiting websites could be attacked through 
intermediaries – namely, third parties who provide various 
services that enable infringing websites to thrive, and on a 
more basic level, exist. This section will compare the three bills 
topically, covering the domain names and websites potentially 
affected; the bills’ varying definitions of “infringement”; the 
third parties through whom plaintiffs would attack infringing 
sites; the procedures to be employed; and the miscellaneous 
provisions tacked onto each bill. 
 
 
 
 
219. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter 
SOPA I]. An amended version was introduced two months later. Amendment 
in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 3261, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (as 
amended by House, Dec. 12, 2011) [hereinafter SOPA II]. 
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 1. Defining “Infringement” 
 
Both COICA and PIPA were directed at sites “dedicated to 
infringing activities.”220 COICA defined “dedicated to infringing 
activities” in several ways. First, the term included sites 
subject to civil forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 2323.221 Second, the 
term included sites that were “primarily designed,” marketed, 
or had no “demonstrable, commercially significant” purpose or 
use other than to infringe copyrights, circumvent protection 
mechanisms, or sell or distribute counterfeit goods.222 
PIPA’s definition of “dedicated to infringing activities” did 
not use civil forfeiture as a measuring stick,223 but is otherwise 
substantially similar to the “primarily designed” prong of 
COICA.224 However, the definition also included websites 
which enable and facilitate such infringement,225 and, in this 
respect, was likely adopted in lieu of a direct reference to the 
civil forfeiture statute, which itself covers property used to 
facilitate the commission of certain intellectual property 
crimes.226 
SOPA did not adopt the terminology used by COICA and 
PIPA, instead setting its sights on two targets: “foreign 
 
220. COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(a); PIPA, supra note 218, § 2(7); 
COICA II, supra note 217, § 2(a)(1). 
221. (a) Civil forfeiture. 
(1) Property subject to forfeiture. The following property is 
subject to forfeiture to the United States Government: 
(A) Any article, the making or trafficking of which is, 
prohibited under section 506 of title 17, or section 2318, 
2319, 2319A, 2319B, or 2320, or chapter 90, of this title. 
(B) Any property used, or intended to be used, in any 
manner or part to commit or facilitate the commission of an 
offense referred to in subparagraph (A). 
(C) Any property constituting or derived from any proceeds 
obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the commission 
of an offense referred to in subparagraph (A). 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2323(a) (West 2011). 
222. COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(a). 
223. PIPA, supra note 218, § 2(7). 
224. Compare PIPA, supra note 218, § 2(7), with COICA I, supra note 217, 
§ 2(A)(2)(a). 
225. PIPA, supra note 218, § 2(7). 
226. Id. 
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infringing sites” (for purposes of the Attorney General) and 
“sites dedicated to theft of U.S. property” (for purposes of 
private plaintiffs). However, SOPA’s chosen terms had a 
similar spirit and scope. “Foreign infringing sites” were defined 
as those foreign sites directed to the United States, and which 
would be subject to civil forfeiture if they were domestic 
sites.227 SOPA’s definition of “sites dedicated to theft of U.S. 
property” essentially mirrors that of PIPA, including the 
engage/enable/facilitate triad.228 Thus, the three bills take 
slightly different routes to reach the same destination, 
targeting sites that committed infringements themselves, as 
well as those that aided others commit infringements, whether 
they did so with or without actual knowledge of the 
infringement. 
 
 2. Actions Authorized and Domain Names Potentially 
Affected 
 
All three bills authorize the Attorney General to bring in 
rem actions against domain names associated with infringing 
websites.229 PIPA and SOPA also authorize the Attorney 
General to bring in personam actions against the registrants or 
operators of infringing sites.230 However, in personam actions 
would likely be rare, given online counterfeiters’ proven track 
record of concealing their true identities and locations, and the 
strong likelihood that, in any event, they are located outside 
the United States. Additionally, and in a much more significant 
way, PIPA and SOPA expanded on COICA by creating a 
private right of action allowing brand owners and content 
owners to proceed in rem against certain domain names 
associated with infringing websites. 
COICA would have permitted the Attorney General to 
commence an action against any domain name used in 
connection with a “site dedicated to infringing activities.”231 In 
 
227. SOPA I, supra note 219, §102(a). 
228. Id. § 103(a)(1). 
229. See COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(c)(1); PIPA, supra note 218, § 
3(a)(2); SOPA I, supra note 219, § 102(b)(2). 
230. PIPA, supra note 218, § 3(a)(1); SOPA I, supra note 219, § 102(b)(1). 
231. COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(a)(1). 
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its original and amended forms, COICA places no geographical 
restrictions on the domain names subject to action.232 Thus, 
COICA’s reach extended to domains administered and issued 
by foreign domain name registries and registrars, as well their 
counterparts residing in the United States. 
PIPA circumscribed the Attorney General’s powers, 
limiting actions to those against “nondomestic domain 
names”233 – that is, domain names issued and operated by 
registrars and registries outside the United States.234 However, 
PIPA afforded brand owners the same reach that COICA 
afforded the Attorney General: brand owners were authorized 
to bring actions against all domain names, regardless of their 
situs.235 
SOPA took a similar bifurcated approach. The Attorney 
General was authorized to act against “foreign infringing 
sites,”236 which (in addition to being deemed infringing) had a 
registrar, registry and IP address located outside the United 
States.237 But, like PIPA, SOPA authorized brand owners to act 
against a broader range of domain names (those associated 
with sites “dedicated to theft of U.S. property”) regardless of 
their situs.238 Though SOPA was amended to essentially limit 
 
232. See COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(a) (where “domain name” is not a 
defined term), and COICA II, supra note 217, § 2(a)(2) (adopting definition of 
“domain name” from 15 U.S.C. § 1127). The Lanham Act defines a domain 
name as “any alphanumeric designation which is registered with or assigned by 
any domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name 
registration authority as part of an electronic address on the Internet.” (emphasis 
added). Lanham Act, § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
233. PIPA, supra note 218, § 3(a). 
234. PIPA, supra note 218, § 2(9). Of course the Attorney General would 
still be able to act against domestic domain names under the civil forfeiture 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2323, which served as the basis for the Department of 
Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) wave of 
domain seizures beginning in June 2010. 
235. PIPA, supra note 218, § 4(a); see also id. § 2(1) (incorporating 
definition of “domain name” from 15 U.S.C. § 1127). 
236. SOPA I, supra note 219, § 102(a). 
237. See generally SOPA I, supra note 219; see also definitions of “foreign 
infringing sites,” id. § 102(a), “foreign Internet site,” id. § 101(8), “domestic 
Internet site,” id. § 101(5), “domestic domain name,” id. § 101(3) and “domestic 
internet protocol address,” id. § 101(4). But again, the Attorney General’s 
recourse to civil forfeiture proceedings against domestic domain names was 
unaffected. 
238. SOPA I, supra note 219, § 103(a). 
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its reach to foreign sites, brand owners could still use SOPA to 
reach domains associated with domestic registries and/or 
registrars, as long as the owner of the site was located outside 
the United States.239 
 
 3. Procedures 
 
Upon commencing an action under COICA, the Attorney 
General could seek relief authorized under Rule 65 of the 
Federal Rules of Procedure, including a temporary restraining 
order or preliminary injunction ordering the target to cease its 
infringing activities.240 And upon receipt of an order, the 
Attorney General could serve a copy on certain intermediaries 
to compel them to take actions to restrict the website’s 
functionality and accessibility. For example, in the case of 
domestic domains, COICA provided that “[u]pon receipt of such 
order, the domain registrar or domain name registry shall 
suspend operation of, and may lock, the domain name.”241 
Thus, service of a court order upon the relevant U.S. 
registrar/registry could disable access to an entire website via 
the targeted domain name.242 
For “nondomestic” domain names, the Attorney General’s 
options were different. COICA identified three types of 
intermediaries that the Attorney General could serve with a 
court order: (1) “service providers”; (2) “financial transaction 
providers” (“FTPs”); and (3) “services that provide 
advertisements to Internet sites” (“Ad Services”).243 Each group 
was charged with a different set of duties to be performed upon 
receipt of an order. 
 
 
239. SOPA II, supra note 219, § 103(a)(1). For a definition of a “U.S-
directed site”, see id. § 101(23). 
240. COIA II, supra note 217, § 2(b). 
241. COICA II, supra note 217, § 2(e)(1). 
242. STEVE CROCKER, ET AL., SECURITY AND OTHER TECHNICAL CONCERNS 
RAISED BY THE DNS FILTERING REQUIREMENTS IN THE PROTECT IP BILL 
(2011), available at 
http://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/SHNKROUS/S110
525C.pdf. 
243. COICA II, supra note 217, § 2(e)(2). 
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COICA defined “service providers” broadly, incorporating 
the meaning ascribed to that term in 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1),244 
as well as encompassing “any other operator of a 
nonauthoritative domain name system.”245 Upon receipt of an 
order, a service provider (such as Comcast, Verizon, and other 
ISPs) would be required to take “technically feasible and 
reasonable steps designed to prevent a domain name from 
resolving to that domain name’s Internet protocol address.”246 
FTPs (such as Visa and MasterCard), defined with reference to 
31 U.S.C. § 5362(4),247 would be required to take “reasonable 
measures . . . designed to prevent or prohibit [their] services 
from completing payment transactions” between the site and 
U.S. customers.248 Finally, Ad Services that supplied 
advertisements to the website were to cease doing so upon 
receipt of the court order.249 
 
244. (k) Definitions. 
(1) Service provider. 
(A) As used in subsection (a), the term "service provider" 
means an entity offering the transmission, routing, or 
providing of connections for digital online communications, 
between or among points specified by a user, of material of 
the user's choosing, without modification to the content of 
the material as sent or received. 
(B) As used in this section, other than subsection (a), the 
term "service provider" means a provider of online services 
or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and 
includes an entity described in subparagraph (A). 
 
17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (2010). 
245. COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(e)(2). “Nonauthoritative domain name 
system server” is not defined in the original or amended versions of COICA. 
It is, however, defined in the Stop Online Piracy Act as “a server that does 
not contain complete copies of domains but uses a cache file that is comprised 
of previous domain name server lookups, for which the server has received an 
authoritative response in the past.” SOPA I, supra note 219, § 101(19). 
246. COICA II, supra note 217, § 2(e)(2)(B)(i). 
247. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(4) (2006). (“(4) Financial transaction provider. The 
term ‘financial transaction provider’ means a creditor, credit card issuer, 
financial institution, operator of a terminal at which an electronic fund 
transfer may be initiated, money transmitting business, or international, 
national, regional, or local payment network utilized to effect a credit 
transaction, electronic fund transfer, stored value product transaction, or 
money transmitting service, or a participant in such network, or other 
participant in a designated payment system.”). 
248. COICA II, supra note 217, § 2(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
249. COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(e)(2)(B)(iii). 
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PIPA and SOPA operated in much the same way, but with 
slight variations. For example, PIPA did away with COICA’s 
expansive definition of “service provider.” In its place, PIPA 
referred simply to “operators of a nonauthoritative domain 
name system server” (“DNS Operators”).250 And in addition to 
DNS Operators, FTPs, and Ad Services, all of which had 
analogues under COICA, PIPA identified a fourth discrete 
category of intermediaries on whom the Attorney General 
might serve an order: “information location tools,”251 i.e., search 
engines. Upon receipt of an order, information location tools 
would be required to take reasonable measures to “(i) remove 
or disable access to the Internet site associated with the 
 
250. PIPA, supra note 218, § 3(d)(2)(A)(i). 
251. PIPA, supra note 218, § 3(d)(2)(A). (the term “information location 
tool” is a defined term); see also PIPA, supra note 218, § 2(4). PIPA draws 
upon 17 U.S.C. § 512(d): 
(d) Information location tools. A service provider shall not be 
liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in 
subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for 
infringement of copyright by reason of the provider referring 
or linking users to an online location containing infringing 
material or infringing activity, by using information location 
tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or 
hypertext link, if the service provider— 
(1) (A) does not have actual knowledge that the material or 
activity is infringing; 
(B) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of 
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent; or 
(C) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; 
(2) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable 
to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service 
provider has the right and ability to control such activity; 
and 
(3) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in 
subsection (c)(3), responds expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to, the material that is claimed to be 
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity, except 
that, for purposes of this paragraph, the information 
described in subsection (c)(3)(A)(iii) shall be identification of 
the reference or link, to material or activity claimed to be 
infringing, that is to be removed or access to which is to be 
disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit 
the service provider to locate that reference or link. 
 
17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2010). 
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domain name . . . or (ii) not serve a hypertext link to such 
Internet site.”252 Thus, in addition to terminating a website’s 
ability to process payments, depriving it of its advertisements 
and associated revenue, and blocking DNS translation of the 
associated domain name, the Attorney General could also 
demand that a nondomestic domain be de-indexed from search 
engine results. Private actors were limited to compelling action 
by only FTPs and Ad Services.253 
SOPA provided slightly different terminology and 
definitions, but essentially affected the same types of 
intermediaries.254 Far more notable was the “Market-Based 
System to Protect U.S. Customers and Prevent U.S. Funding of 
Sites Dedicated to Theft of U.S. Property” that appeared in the 
original version of SOPA.255 This so-called market-based 
system called for the creation of a DMCA-like notice/counter 
notice framework to be used by brand owners prior to, and as a 
prerequisite for, seeking a court order to compel action by FTPs 
and Ad Services.256 A plaintiff would serve a “notification 
regarding internet sites dedicated to theft of U.S. property” 
upon the agent designated by the intermediary. The recipient 
intermediary was required to notify the alleged infringer and 
take “technically feasible and reasonable measures” within no 
more than five days to suspend their services.257 FTPs were 
tasked with preventing the infringing site from completing 
payment transactions with consumers in the United States.258 
Ad Services were to cease providing advertisements to or for 
the infringing site, and cease providing or receiving ad revenue 
 
252. PIPA, supra note 218, § 3 (d)(2)(D). 
253. PIPA, supra note 218, § 4(d)(2). 
254. For example, PIPA defined FTPs with reference to 31 U.S.C. § 
5362(4). SOPA speaks of “payment network providers,” meaning those who 
“directly or indirectly provide[] the proprietary services, infrastructure, and 
software to effect or facilitate a debit, credit, or other payment transaction.” 
SOPA II, supra note 219, § 101(20)(a). In addition, SOPA uses the term 
“internet search engine” in place of PIPA’s “information location tool,” and 
defines it differently. Compare SOPA II, supra note 219, § 101(15), with 
PIPA, supra note 218, § 2(4), and 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2010). 
255. SOPA I, supra note 219, § 103. 
256. Id. § 103(b). 
257. Id. § 103(b)(1)-(3). 
258. Id. § 103(b)(1). 
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derived from the infringing site.259 If the recipient intermediary 
did not take appropriate action in response to the notice, or 
resumed supplying services upon receipt of a counter-notice 
from the alleged infringer, then the brand owner could 
commence an action and obtain an order compelling the third 
party to take action under the same framework set out in 
COICA and PIPA.260 
 
 4. Safe Harbors 
 
Each bill afforded immunities to the third-party services 
providers compelled to take action against infringing sites. 
COICA provided immunity to these various third-party service 
providers for taking actions “reasonably designed to comply” 
with an order.261 COICA also provided immunity in instances 
where a third-party service provider voluntarily ceased 
providing its services to a website it “reasonably believe[d]” 
was dedicated to infringing activities.262 However, in the event 
that a third-party service provider “knowingly and willfully” 
failed to take appropriate action in response to an order, the 
Attorney General was entitled to seek injunctive relief to 
compel compliance.263 Likewise, Section 5 of PIPA provided 
immunity to third-party service providers for voluntary actions 
taken “in good faith and based on credible evidence” against 
sites reasonably believed to be dedicated to infringing 
activities.264 PIPA also extended that immunity to actions 
taken against sites “engaged in infringing activities that 
endanger the public health.”265 Similar safe harbors were 
provided under SOPA. 
 
 
 
 
259. Id. § 103(b)(2). 
260. Id. § 103(c). 
261. COICA II, supra note 217, § 2(e)(5)(A). 
262. Id. § 2(e)(5)(B) (this subsection did not appear in the original bill, 
COICA I). 
263. Id. § 2(g)(1). 
264. PIPA, supra note 218, § 5(a). 
265. Id. § 5(b). 
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 5. Miscellaneous Provisions 
 
In its original form, COICA contained a subsection (j) 
which provided that the Attorney General would “maintain a 
public listing of domains that, upon information and reasonable 
belief, the Department of Justice determines are dedicated to 
infringing activities but for which the Attorney General has not 
filed an action under this section.”266 Service providers, FTPs, 
and Ad Services were encouraged to voluntarily deny their 
services to sites identified on the Attorney General’s list, and 
offered similar safe harbors as applied to actions compelled by 
order.267 Subsection (j) also set out procedures for website 
owners/operators to petition the Attorney General to have their 
sites removed from the list, and for judicial oversight of the 
Attorney General’s decisions on such petitions.268 Not 
surprisingly, Subsection (j) led opponents to dub COICA as an 
“internet blacklist” bill.269 This provision did not appear in the 
amended version of COICA. 
For its part, SOPA also proposed a number of amendments 
to Titles 17 and 18, as well as provisions for dealing with 
“notorious foreign infringers,” and defending IP rights 
abroad.270 Among the more controversial (and unrelated to 
counterfeiting) was a provision tightening restrictions on online 
streaming of copyrighted content.271 Opponents dubbed this the 
“Free Bieber” provision, alluding to pop star Justin Bieber’s 
rise to fame, which had its roots in his unauthorized YouTube 
video performances of copyrighted musical compositions.272 
 
 
266. COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(j). 
267. COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(j)(2). 
268. Id. § 2(j)(3)-(4). 
269. David Segal & Aaron Swartz, Stop the Internet Blacklist, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2010, 9:40 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-segal/stop-the-internet-
blackli_b_739836.html. 
270. SOPA II, supra note 219, §§ 201-205. 
271. Id. § 201. 
272. Amy Schatz, What Is SOPA Anyway? A Guide to Understanding the 
Online Piracy Bill, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203735304577167261853938
938.html. 
63
LINDENBAUMMACRO 65 PAGES 11/13/2012 9:07 AM 
630 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
B. Objections to the Proposed Legislation 
 
The Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously approved 
COICA on November 18, 2010.273 Eleven days later, Senator 
Ron Wyden (D-OR) placed a hold on the legislation, writing 
that COICA “attempts to protect intellectual property in the 
digital arena in a way that could trample free speech and stifle 
competition and important new innovations in the digital 
economy.”274 With the Wyden hold in place, COICA died at the 
close of the Congressional session. Senator Wyden similarly 
placed a hold on PIPA in the Senate,275 and vowed to filibuster 
PIPA if the hold were lifted.276 Senator Wyden wrote of PIPA, 
I understand and agree with the goal of the 
legislation, to protect intellectual property and 
combat commerce in counterfeit goods, but I am 
not willing to muzzle speech and stifle innovation 
and economic growth to achieve this objective. At 
the expense of legitimate commerce, PIPA’s 
prescription takes an overreaching approach to 
policing the Internet when a more balanced and 
targeted approach would be more effective. The 
collateral damage of this approach is speech, 
innovation and the very integrity of the 
Internet.277 
Technology companies such as Google and Facebook, who 
likely would be directly affected by passage of the bills, shared 
 
273. Sam Gustin, Web Censorship Bill Sails Through Senate Committee, 
WIRED.COM (Nov. 18, 2010, 2:50 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/11/coica-web-censorship-bill/all/1. 
274. Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator from Oregon, Statement by Senator Ron 
Wyden Objecting to Unanimous Consent to Proceed to the Combating Online 
Infringement and Counterfeits Act (Nov. 29, 2010), available at 
http://wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Statement%20on%20COICA%20hold.
pdf. 
275. Press Release, U.S. Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden Places Hold on 
Protect IP Act (May 26, 2011), available at 
http://wyden.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=33a39533-1b25-437b-
ad1d-9039b44cde92. 
276. David Kravets, Senator Threatens to Filibuster Internet Blacklisting 
Bill, WIRED.COM (Nov. 21, 2011, 4:56 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/11/wyden-pipa-filibuster/. 
277. Wyden Places Hold on Protect IP Act, supra note 275. 
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Wyden’s opposition. In a letter to members of Congress 
published in the New York Times in November 2011, Silicon 
Valley rivals joined forces to voice concerns that PIPA and 
SOPA created “uncertain liabilities,” required “monitoring of 
websites,” threatened cybersecurity, and undermined the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).278 
On January 14, 2012, the Obama Administration 
announced its opposition to PIPA and SOPA: “[W]e will not 
support legislation that reduces freedom of expression, 
increases cybersecurity risk, or undermines the dynamic 
innovative global internet.”279 The Obama administration 
advocated for more narrowly tailored legislation, and 
encouraged brand and content owners and service providers to 
work cooperatively.280 Days later, on January 18, 2012, 
thousands of websites, including Wikipedia and Mozilla, went 
“dark” in a massive coordinated protest of PIPA and SOPA.281 
The blackout of these websites was intended to provide 
internet users with a “visceral example” of what website 
operators feared might result (i.e., the forced shut down of their 
website) should either bill be passed.282 The online protests 
were accompanied by physical demonstrations in cities such as 
New York, where protestors assembled outside of 
Congressional offices.283 
 
 
 
278. We Stand Together to Protect Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011, 
at A11. 
279. Victoria Espinel, Aneesh Chopra & Howard Schmidt, Official White 
House Response to Stop the E-PARASITE Act and 1 other petition: Combating 
Online Piracy while Protecting an Open and Innovative Internet, WE THE 
PEOPLE, https://wwws.whitehouse.gov/petition-tool/response/combating-
online-piracy-while-protecting-open-and-innovative-internet. 
280. Id. 
281. Zach Carter & Ryan Grim, SOPA Blackout Aims to Block Internet 
Censorship Bill, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2012, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/18/sopa-blackout-internet-
censorship_n_1211905.html. 
282. Jon Swartz & Scott Martin, Proposals Spur Website Protests, USA 
TODAY, Jan. 18, 2012, at B1, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/MONEY/usaedition/2012-01-18-SOPA-
Protest_ST_U.htm (quoting Rob Berschizze, Managing Editor, Boing Boing). 
283. Carter & Grim, supra note 281. 
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Following the outpouring of opposition, both houses of 
Congress delayed further action on the bills indefinitely.284 The 
following sections will highlight some of the more prominent 
objections underlying the protests, which remain relevant even 
as the bills’ support in Congress waned, then vanished. 
 
 1. Creation of a Duty to Monitor 
 
On any given day, sites such as YouTube provides access to 
numerous videos that incorporate copyrighted materials 
without authorization. While many are clearly fair uses, many 
are clearly infringements. Likewise, a large number of items 
sold or offered for sale on auction sites like eBay are 
counterfeit. To date, YouTube, eBay, and many others have 
avoided liability in the United States for their roles in 
providing access to infringing content and counterfeit products, 
because they contend that until notified of a specific instance of 
infringement, they do not truly know whether a particular item 
is infringing. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and 
District Court for the Southern District of New York (among 
others) have endorsed this theory, holding that “generalized 
knowledge” that infringements may be occurring on an online 
platform does not subject the operator to contributory liability 
for trademark or copyright infringement.285 Opponents of PIPA 
and SOPA argue that the proposed legislation would impose on 
eBay and YouTube (and like platforms) a duty to monitor their 
systems for infringing content and counterfeit products, or else 
face termination of services and shuttering of their sites.286 
Imposing such a duty runs counter to current contributory 
liability case law, and, some argue, serves as an end-around to 
the DMCA’s safe harbor provision. 
 
 
284. Michael Macleod-Ball, SOPA and PIPA Votes Delayed Indefinitely, 
ACLU (Jan. 20, 2012, 11:52 AM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech-
technology-and-liberty/sopa-and-pipa-votes-delayed-indefinitely. 
285. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(stating that allegations failed to provide sufficient knowledge under 
Inwood); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
286. We Stand Together to Protect Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011, 
at A11. 
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Under current law, when notified of specific instances of 
infringement, eBay and YouTube take action to remove 
infringing items to escape liability. YouTube, because it deals 
in copyrighted content, relies on the provisions of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act.287 The DMCA provides a safe 
harbor for hosts of websites that publish materials that 
infringe a party’s copyright, provided that, upon notice from 
the copyright owner, the content host promptly disables access 
to the infringing materials.288 The DMCA has been interpreted 
to mean that a host cannot be liable for its failure to act upon 
general knowledge that its site may be offering infringing 
material, so long as it doesn’t take an active role in the 
infringing activity, and upon notice of actual infringing 
material residing on its website, promptly disables the 
infringing content.289 For this reason, despite the fact that it 
knows its site is used by many to post infringing videos, a site 
like YouTube cannot be held liable because upon notice of any 
specific infringing video, it takes prompt measures to remove 
the video.290 
Although trademark law does not have an analogous 
statutory safe harbor, similar common law principles apply. 
Currently, contributory trademark infringement law does not 
impose on service providers an affirmative duty to seek out 
infringing content or products posted on the websites they 
operate, or passing through their networks.291 For example, in 
Tiffany v. eBay, the Second Circuit held that although eBay 
was generally aware that its site was being used to sell 
thousands of counterfeit Tiffany products, this did not support 
a claim for contributory infringement against eBay.292 Because 
eBay took prompt measures to remove specific items reported 
to be infringing, but did not otherwise have “[c]ontemporary 
knowledge of which particular listings [were] infringing,” eBay 
 
287. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
288. 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E) (2006). 
289. Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525. 
290. Id. at 526. 
291. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
292. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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was found to have satisfied its legal obligations.293 However, if 
the evidence showed that eBay was “willfully blind” to the 
infringement – that is, that it “intentionally shielded itself from 
discovering the offending listings” – a contributory 
infringement claim could lie.294 
Opponents argue that PIPA and SOPA threaten to upset 
the existing balances of the contributory liability doctrine and 
the DMCA safe harbor provision, shifting the burden to police 
infringing content from the intellectual property owner to the 
website host. Thus, sites like YouTube and eBay would be 
placed in the position of monitoring the vast and constantly 
evolving bodies of user-generated content that appear on their 
sites, and making unilateral determinations whether such 
content might infringe the rights of known or unknown third 
parties, lest they be shut down or deprived of funding. 
However, supporters insist that the bills are directed toward 
“foreign rogue websites,” and not intended to impose such 
draconian measures against legitimate websites.295 
Representative Lamar Smith, SOPA’s primary sponsor, 
contends that blogs and social networking sites “have nothing 
to worry about.”296 This is because “[w]ebsites like Facebook 
and YouTube that host user content are not ‘primarily 
dedicated to’ illegal activity” and do not market themselves as 
such.297 Notwithstanding these assurances, sites like YouTube 
and eBay may have legitimate cause for concern, as Mr. Smith 
cannot guarantee that the Attorney General or brand and 
content owners such as Tiffany and Viacom will agree.298 
 
293. Id. 
294. Id. at 109. 
295. Edward Wyatt, Lines Drawn on Antipiracy Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
14, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/technology/lines-
are-drawn-on-legislation-against-internet-piracy.html?pagewanted=all. 
296. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, MYTH VS. 
FACT: STOP ONLINE PIRACY ACT, available at 
http://www.judiciary.house.gov/issues/Rogue%20Websites/011812_SOPA%20
Myth%20vs%20Fact.pdf (last visited March 19, 2012). 
297. Id. 
298. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2010). For 
example, in its suit against eBay, Tiffany claimed that its own investigations 
revealed that 73.1% and 75.5% percent of TIFFANY merchandise purchased 
through eBay in 2004 and 2005 was counterfeit. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay 
Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (these studies were deemed 
68http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/1
LINDENBAUMMACRO 65 PAGES 11/13/2012 9:07 AM 
2012] CATCH ME IF YOU CAN 635 
 2. Compromising the Security and Stability of the Internet 
 
Some of the strongest opposition to PIPA and SOPA 
pertains to the ability to manipulate the Domain Name System 
(DNS). In simplest terms, the DNS is a like a telephone 
directory for the Internet. Computers communicate with each 
other using numerical IP addresses (for example the IP address 
for Google.com is 207.151.159.3), which are difficult for humans 
to remember.299 In order to make the Internet user-friendly, 
DNS translates easy-to-remember domain names, such as 
google.com, into the numerical IP Addresses that computers 
use to identify locations on the Internet.300 
As one way to combat online infringement, PIPA and 
SOPA would allow the Attorney General to obtain an order 
compelling service providers to block DNS translation of 
domain names, severing the domain name from its associated 
IP address. Some opponents argue that DNS filtering would 
undermine the universality of domain names, “one of the key 
enablers of the innovation, economic growth, and 
improvements in communications and information access 
unleashed by the global Internet.”301 
In addition, DNS filtering is said to raise cybersecurity 
concerns. Critics contend that the system proposed by PIPA 
and SOPA, which would include redirecting users to different 
resources (such as a message from the Department of Justice) 
in response to a DNS request, is incompatible with DNS 
Security Extensions (DNSSEC) measures designed to 
authenticate DNS records.302 By interfering with, or inhibiting 
DNSSEC authentication, PIPA and SOPA would potentially 
threaten cybersecurity with respect to “distribution of malware 
and other problematic Internet behavior . . . which could expose 
personal information, credit card data, e-mails, documents, 
stock data, and other sensitive information.”303 Further still, 
opponents explain that DNS filtering and re-direction would 
 
“methodologically flawed and of questionable value” by the trial court). 
299. CROCKER ET AL, supra note 242, at 3. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. at 4. 
302. Id. at 5. 
303. Id. 
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threaten security in the absence of a “mechanism to distinguish 
court-ordered lookup failure from temporary system failure, or 
even from failure caused by attackers or hostile networks.”304 
Perhaps most compelling are arguments that the bills’ 
DNS filtering and re-direction approach is easily circumvented, 
and therefore simply ineffective. First, the filtering will not 
remove any infringing content from the targeted website, or 
even disable the website. Filtering only severs the tie between 
the domain name and the IP address where the website 
resides. Thus, even if DNS filtering blocked translation of the 
domain google.com, its content would still be accessible if 
accessed directly by its (numerical) IP address. The websites 
would also remain accessible through non-filtered 
nameservers.305 And of course, the infringing content can also 
remain accessible through the DNS by the website owner 
simply moving it to a new domain name. 
Faced with strong concerns about the ramifications of 
PIPA and SOPA on the security and stability of the DNS, the 
filtering provisions were removed from the bills.306 
 
 3. Constitutional Concerns 
 
The bills’ supporters have taken the position that the 
“First Amendment is not an excuse for illegal activity.”307 
Opponents, however, contend that PIPA and SOPA, by 
potentially shuttering allegedly infringing websites on an ex 
parte basis, without affording the owner an opportunity to be 
heard, impose impermissible prior restraints on speech.308 To 
avoid unnecessarily infringing critical First Amendment rights, 
 
304. Id. 
305. Id. at 7. 
306. Jon Swartz & Scott Martin, Proposals Spur Website Protests, USA 
TODAY (Jan. 17, 2012, 8:50 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/MONEY/usaedition/2012-01-18-SOPA-
Protest_ST_U.htm. 
307. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, supra note 
296. 
308. Letter from Mark A Lemley, David S. Levine, and David Post to 
House of Representatives (Nov. 15, 2011), available at 
https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/SOPA_House_letter_with_PROTECT_IP_letter
_FINAL.pdf. 
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allegedly infringing websites should not be shuttered until 
after a “prompt final judicial determination [on the legality of 
the conduct] in an adversary hearing.” 
To the extent that PIPA and SOPA draw upon civil 
forfeiture procedure, their constitutionality is under collateral 
attack in Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States.309 Puerto 
80 arose out of the Department of Homeland Security 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) wave of domain 
name seizures dubbed “Operation in Our Sites 2.0.”310 ICE 
obtained a seizure warrant for two of Puerto 80’s domain 
names, rojadirecta.org and rojadirecta.com, which were 
allegedly used to commit criminal copyright infringements, 
namely, the streaming of copyrighted broadcasts of sporting 
events.311 Puerto 80 challenged the seizure in the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York and petitioned for 
return of its domain names, contending that its sites merely 
hosted message forums and indexed links to – but did not 
directly host – the infringing content.312 Puerto 80 also claimed 
that the seizure and suppression of its website violated its First 
Amendment rights.313 The Court denied Puerto 80’s petition, 
finding that the alleged First Amendment violations did not 
constitute the “substantial hardship” required to release the 
domains.314 Puerto 80 appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing 
that the ex parte seizure of the domains constituted a prior 
 
309. See Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11-3390-cv, 
2011 WL 6148823 (2d Cir. Dec 6, 2011). 
310. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, New York Investigators Seize 10 Websites That 
Illegally Streamed Copyrighted Sporting and Pay-Per-View Events (Feb. 2, 
2011), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1102/110202newyork.htm. 
311. Id. 
312. Petition for Release of Seized Property at ¶ 26, Puerto 80 Projects, 
S.L.U. v. United States, 1:11-cv-3983-PAC (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2011), 
available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2011-06-
13-Puerto%2080%20Petitionfor%20Release%20of%20Seized%20Property.pdf. 
313. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. 
314. Order Denying Release of Domain Names, at 4, Puerto 80 Projects, 
S.L.U. v. United States, 1:11-cv-3983-PAC (S.D.N.Y. Aug.4, 2011), available 
at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2011-08-04-
District%20Court%20Order.pdf. 
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restraint on speech, rendering the seizures unconstitutional.315 
As of the writing of this article, the Second Circuit has not yet 
issued its decision, and rojadirecta.org and rojadirecta.com 
continue to display ICE seizure notices more than a year 
later.316 
Opponents of PIPA and SOPA also point out that the bills 
stand to affect the freedom of expression of individuals beyond 
that of the infringer.317 For example, if a blogging site were 
found to host an infringing post, the Attorney General could 
conceivably have the entire site shut down, thus suppressing 
an overwhelming and disproportionate amount of non-
infringing speech. In addition to the problems of notice and 
prior restraints symbolized by the Puerto 80 case, this type of 
“collateral damage” to non-infringing speech is a serious cause 
for concern among free-speech advocates.318 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
As the dust starts to settle after the flurry of activity 
surrounding this legislation, we see that opponents to the bills 
have passionately outlined the parade of horribles they fear 
would follow should this legislation (in any of their drafted 
forms) be approved. Interestingly, proponents of the bills agree 
that the negative implications raised by the opponents would 
be important to avoid. However, they argue that the parade of 
horribles is outside the intent and goals of the bills and 
unlikely to come to fruition. 
For now, we put aside discussion of the merits of the 
opposition to the proposed legislation. Instead, we consider the 
impact the proposed legislation would have on the battle 
 
315. Opening Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2, Puerto 80 Projects, 
S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11-3390 (2d Cir. Sept. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2011-09-16-
Puerto%2080%20Opening%20Brief.pdf. 
316. See ROJADIRECTA, rojadirecta.org (last visited July 25, 2012); 
ROJADIRECTA, rojadirecta.com (last visited July 25, 2012). 
317. Laura W. Murphy & Michael W. Macleod-Ball, Stop Online Piracy 
Act, in WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE ACLU 2 (2011), available at 
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/Statement%20to%20HJC%20S
OPA%2011-16-11.pdf. 
318. Id. 
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against counterfeiters if the bills achieve what their supporters 
argue is their intended purpose We conclude that passage of 
any of these bills would serve as an endorsement of the efforts 
that are discussed in this paper, and which are already 
underway by brand owners, payment processors and the 
federal government.319 
In particular, passage of this legislation would send a 
message to federal courts that permitting brand owners to 
efficiently and cost-effectively resolve counterfeit disputes 
involving large numbers of domains is consistent with the goals 
set by Congress. Likewise, the district courts’ orders compelling 
domain name registrars and payment processors to disable 
websites and intercept funding for such sites, closely parallels 
the statutory language of PIPA and SOPA that aim to 
authorize such action. Moreover, passage of these bills would 
not only endorse the (now) voluntary actions taken by credit 
card processors, but would make them mandatory, immunizing 
the processors for their efforts in assisting brand owners with 
termination of counterfeit websites, and for policing use of their 
own marks. 
This naturally leads to the questions of: (1) whether the 
tools available to brand owners that are discussed in this 
article, namely mass domain lawsuits and assistance of 
payment processors, which seemingly would be endorsed by 
SOPA and PIPA, are sufficient to overcome the ever-crippling 
problem of online counterfeit websites; and (2) given that these 
tools already exist, whether the passage of SOPA and/or PIPA 
would have any impact on the effectiveness of these tools. The 
answer: we don’t know – yet. 
In the end, it almost certainly comes down to the numbers. 
For brand owners to prevail, they need to reach a level of 
efficiency whereby they can manipulate these tools (and 
perhaps other tools) to create enough of a disruption – in terms 
 
319. A federal government seizure of the popular filing sharing website 
megaupload.com, and the arrest of four of its owners earlier this year, 
prompted many to question whether legislation such as SOPA and PIPA are 
truly necessary. The seizure of megaupload.com highlighted the powers 
already vested in the federal government to combat online piracy. See 
Andrew Couts, MegaUpload Shut Down by Feds: Why Do We Need SOPA?, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 19, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/megaupload-shut-down-
feds-why-sopa-225952735.html. 
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of sheer number of terminated websites, disabled merchant 
accounts and frozen financial assets – that it no longer remains 
profitable for a website owner to continue creating and 
optimizing new sites, registering new domains, and 
establishing new merchant accounts. Or at minimum, so that 
the counterfeit website owner is persuaded to simply direct its 
counterfeit activity towards some other less aggressive brand 
owner’s property. 
To date, this threshold has not been reached, by even the 
most actively-enforcing brand owners. Until this balance is 
tipped in brand owners’ favor, whether by SOPA, PIPA or 
otherwise, there will be insufficient incentive for the 
counterfeit website owners to refrain from their present 
scheme of avoiding eradication through volume and anonymity. 
74http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/1
